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JOHN B. DUNLAP, a native 
of Dallas, Texas, has been 
Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue since last August. 
He has been in the Bureau 
since 1934. During the war, 
Mr. Dunlap served in the 
Army doing Intelligence work. 
He was released from active 
duty in 1945 when he held the 
rank of Brigadier General.
Accountants and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue
by John B. Dunlap, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
IT is only fair that you, as members of the accounting profession, should know 
how your Commissioner of Internal Rev­
enue feels in connection with certain mat­
ters, so that we can have a meeting of 
minds and come together on a common 
meeting ground wherever the occasion de­
mands. It was my practice in Texas—and 
my division covered the state of Texas— 
to meet with the accountants and the mem­
bers of the legal profession at every pos­
sible opportunity. I even encouraged them 
to come to us. I published a little bulletin 
and kept them posted with the latest 
developments and procedures that we 
were following in the Dallas Division and 
in the various collector’s offices and I tried 
to make personal friends out of every one 
of them for the simple reason that I 
knew, as I now know, that the accountants 
in this country can do more to help the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue and that the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue can do more 
to help them when we understand each 
other and are friendly than could ever 
otherwise be possible. I want you to know 
that one of the first things I am doing is 
to try to encourage in all our divisions a 
very, very close acquaintanceship with our 
accountant friends.
There are a lot of things that are for 
the public good, and one of them is 
reflected in what I told my assistants and 
deputies in Washington. Every time they 
put one of these things across my desk for 
me to sign, so far, I have sent it back 
and said, “Rewrite this thing so I can 
understand it.” I do that knowing that if 
I can understand it anybody can.
So I want to repeat that I am looking 
forward to a very happy relationship with 
my friends in the accounting profession 
because we have very, very many mutual 
problems that face us all. We have one 
very common meeting ground, and it has 
been a ground which has not been plowed 
thoroughly on the part of Internal Rev­
enue, and that is that it should be to both 
of our interests to see that the citizens 
of the United States pay only their just 
taxes. I don’t like chiselers and I don’t 
like to see any internal Revenue agent 
make an assessment or recommend one 
just because he thinks he has to make a 
showing. That will be cut out. The jug­
gling of income from one year to another, 
for instance, just to chisel the taxpayer 
out of some interest is against my Bible.
There is another thing, as we begin this 
talk, that I wish you would bear in mind. 
I know that tax people are not popular 
with the public and, in many cases, 1 
know that they are not popular with the 
accountants, but I should like to leave this 
little question with you: where would your 
business be if it were not for the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue?
Both the accounting profession and the 
Bureau face many problems where we can 
be of great help to each other. These 
problems fall into two categories, in my 
opinion: in the first one are the problems 
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of our own making and in the second one 
are the problems that are beyond our con­
trol. I should like to talk for a few minutes 
about those that are beyond our control. 
By “those that are beyond our control,” I 
mean those that arise from the statutes 
enacted by Congress itself. After the stat­
ute is enacted, it is beyond our power or 
beyond yours to do anything about it ex­
cept to accept it as it is, get it inter­
preted through the courts, or possibly get 
it repealed. But while we can do something 
in the way of influencing Congress to see 
that proper tax laws are enacted, by far 
the greatest number of our problems come 
from the taxes enacted into law.
One of the great problems that we are 
faced with today, and that you are faced 
with today, is the rapidly changing tax 
picture. We had the Act of 1950 passed 
late in 1950. We have the Excess Profits 
Tax Act which became effective in Jan­
uary, 1951, and now we have a new law 
that we hope will become effective before 
too much longer, not because I am anxious 
to see a new law, but because of the 
problems that are going to arise if it is 
delayed much longer.
The very swiftness of the passage of 
those acts after the Korean crisis has 
brought many, many problems to all of us. 
Even all the regulations are not yet writ­
ten under those laws. It is a human im­
possibility to get them written and pub­
lished as quickly as that. That is a 
tremendous problem to the Bureau, and I 
know that it is to you, to try to file tax 
returns without adequate regulations. It is 
a very tough proposition. You are guess­
ing; you are in the dark; you don’t know 
how the Commissioner is going to interpret 
those laws in the regulations.
One of the problems that we face, and 
must face, goes right back to the enact­
ment of the Excess Profits Tax Act in 
January of 1951. Even before all the 
returns are filed, we are faced with a 
new Excess Profits Act, or rather amend­
ments to the one already in existence. It 
was necessary for the Congress to extend 
the statutory provision for extensions to 
November 15, 1951, so you no more than 
get the returns filed under the ’51 act, 
than you are faced immediately with the 
necessity for filing a new return under the 
new change. It is a very unfortunate thing. 
I know the problems that it creates among 
the accounting profession. I just want 
you to understand the problems it creates 
in the Bureau. The President has prom­
ised the Congress an early analysis of the 
effect of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 
1951 and, of course, it has been impossible 
to prepare any such analysis—even though 
it is being demanded every day—until 
the returns are in. So we have a prob­
lem there as well as you.
Another problem that comes with this 
new Excess Profits Tax Act arises from 
the very fact that it will be five more years 
before the old one is cleaned up. True, it 
is the goal of the Bureau and its excess 
profits tax counsel to wind up its work by 
the end of this year, but we can’t do it. 
There will still be some three hundred 
major cases left over at the end of 1951. 
I know the grief that will arise in some 
corporations until those problems are 
settled, but it is a job on which we are 
hammering away and on which we are do­
ing the best we can. I only hope that we 
don’t get into such a mess on the new one. 
At the present time, I don’t see how we 
can keep from it.
The act that is now before Congress is 
going to present many, many problems to 
all of us. The major problem that it is 
going to face us with immediately is the 
difficulty of getting into your hands the 
materials with which you must work, al­
most as soon at it is passed. We cannot 
even begin to make a deal with the public 
printer to get our returns printed until 
Congress passes that act. We cannot get 
out the withholding tables until we know 
what the rates are going to be. The act 
is going to call, I am sure, for an effective 
date of November 1st. So, after final pas­
sage of the act, it is going to be necessary 
for the Bureau to undertake a tremendous 
mechanical problem of placing in your 
hands and in the hands of all other busi­
ness people in the country the withholding 
tax tables under the new act.
That is going to be a major problem to 
us. We may have to call for outside help 
in getting it done. I mean by that, getting 
newspapers and magazines and others to 
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help us out by printing those figures before 
we can get the pamphlets from the Govern­
ment Printing Office.
We cannot complete action on the in­
come tax returns themselves. We don’t 
know what the rate is going to be but 
we do know what some of the other pro­
visions are going to be. So, at the present 
time, all we can do is to keep changing 
that dummy form every day as the con­
ference goes along so that the minute 
agreement is struck we can turn those 
things over to the public printer. That 
doesn’t involve only the income tax re­
turns themselves, the Form 1040, 1040 A, 
and all the rest of them, it involves all the 
accompanying regulations, Treasury deci­
sions, everything else that has to be pub­
lished in connection with the new income 
tax law. So I plead with you, be patient 
with us. We are as helpless as we can be 
in the matter and only through your good 
will can we hope to convey to the public 
the problem that is going to be presented 
when they want blank returns and we 
cannot yet furnish them. We are doing our 
best to meet our deadlines on it, but bear 
in mind that you may not be able to get 
what you want when you want it due to 
the lateness of the passage of the act.
In connection with these same forms, 
we have another mutual problem, that is, 
the expense in connection with it. Last 
year the Bureau printed some 785 million 
returns. I am talking about income tax 
returns, not the little withholding and 
Social Security returns. That is a tremen­
dous expense. Congress doesn’t understand 
why we should have to print so many. I 
do, and I am sure you do. I know that 
the taxpayer wants a copy, the accountant 
wants a copy, there has got to be a scratch 
work copy, and the government wants a 
copy. But, even so, multiply the number of 
taxpayers by the number of returns and 
you come up with a lot more than that. 
One of the reasons, of course, is the fact 
that the Bureau mails out returns to all 
taxpayers every year and that those re­
turns are seldom used in the preparation 
of the final return. You all want the un­
folded smooth copies to work with and 
I don’t blame you. That is what I always 
use myself. But that must be. It may be 
looked upon in one light as an economic 
waste but in another light we find that it 
has a very valuable psychological effect. 
It is one of the very few pieces of direct 
mail advertising that the Bureau is allowed 
to have.
In that connection I would like to get 
your reaction to an experiment we are 
going to try this year in only the states 
of Indiana and Massachusetts. Those in 
 states can find out from their friends 
there how it works. The returns will come 
in package form; they will not be folded. 
Every schedule, the necessary returns, in­
structions, and everything else, will come 
in a preaddressed package form, so that 
we can eliminate the necessity of having 
collectors’ offices stuff those returns into 
envelopes by hand. This is a tremendously 
costly job, not only in dollars, but in 
wasted manpower which could better be 
doing something else. If it works, we shall 
spread it all over the whole country next 
year. It will be a much simpler job for 
the Bureau. The returns will come in per­
fect shape, unfolded and useable. We 
would like to have your reaction to that 
experiment as you see those package deals 
come out.
We have another mutual problem, the 
cost analysis of our tax laws to enable us 
to recommend to the Congress methods of 
simplification which will benefit us all. 
There has been some of that done in the 
past, but I don’t think there has been 
enough of it. I should like you to give 
serious consideration to giving the Bureau 
all the help you can and, I assure you, we 
will do our best at our end. You people 
are in close contact with your clients’ 
problems, you know the effect of these 
laws, you know the work some of them 
cause—and possibly cause unnecessarily— 
and only through our combined efforts 
will we ever be successful in any simplifi­
cation.
Our tax structure has gotten to the point 
where we must, in my opinion, do some­
thing to simplify it other than explaining 
them in the directives that come out. The 
laws themselves must be simplified. Any 
suggestions that you people can make to 
us along those lines will be deeply appre­
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ciated. We should like to have your views, 
we want your views, and I trust that, 
through your legislative committees, you 
will have no hesitancy in recommending 
to us any changes that you think would be 
to the benefit of the American taxpayer. 
I am not talking about reduction of taxes, 
that is out of our field. I also extend to 
each of you as individuals an invitation to 
let us have your ideas along that line.
We are going to face another problem. 
You may not consider it mutual, but I 
think you will find that it is mutual before 
it is over. It is contained in some of the 
new provisions of the new act, provisions 
which I am certain will be enacted into 
law because they were enacted identically 
in both houses of Congress. Never before 
has it become the duty of the Internal 
Revenue Service to enforce a law passed, 
I feel primarily, for the public good. They 
passed a law like that under Mr. Volstead’s 
direction some years back. But we are 
going to be faced with a major problem 
in the enforcement of this new gambling 
law. In my opinion, it is not a tax law, it 
is a policing statute. It is going to require 
that the Bureau’s field officers become 
criminal type investigators all the way 
through in handling this type of tax be­
cause under it we are going to have to 
prove that these people are in the illegal 
gambling industry.
That is going to mean, I am fearful—I 
am really fearful of what it will mean— 
that we are going to have to have some 
four thousand additional field men and this 
will cost some forty million dollars a year 
to enforce that tax. It is going to call for 
the keeping of records such as no busi­
nessman was ever required to keep before 
and that is your end of it.
Another problem that is going to be 
more and more mutual is the fact that 
Congress is awakening to the fact that 
many, many taxpayers have not kept the 
kind of records that they should have kept 
and that, after the new tax law becomes 
effective, you are going to see bills start 
through Congress to tighten up the re­
quirements on record keeping, the kind of 
records that must be kept. It is going to 
mean no reflection on the kind of clients 
that I am sure most of you have, but it 
will be a tough proposition. The failure to 
keep proper records will become a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor, and that could 
be a serious proposition. Already, under its 
present power, the Bureau has issued 
instructions which are being carried out. 
We are serving notice upon taxpayers 
whom we do not think have adequate 
records to enable us to determine their 
true tax liability. It is a warning calling 
their attention to the law and the type of 
records they should keep so that when we 
come back the following year, if the 
records are not there, the groundwork will 
have been laid for the prosecution. I 
should like your help in spreading that 
word around. That is a direct outgrowth of 
our activities in the racketeering field.
Another major problem that is of our 
own making—some of it cannot be pre­
vented but the bulk of it can—is the 
time lag between the time that the income 
tax return is filed and the time the 
businessman knows his final tax answer. 
I am making every effort in the Bureau 
to adopt measures to cut down that 
time lag, but there again it is a problem, 
not only ours but yours. We are attacking 
it in several ways. In the first place—it 
has not been published yet, but it will be 
in the next few days—we have completely 
reorganized the income tax unit in the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It has been 
changed from a mass of unrelated activi­
ties into a few well-knit divisions operating 
along functional lines. This will enable 
us to complete our work more quickly and 
more efficiently in the Bureau and it will 
give you quicker answers to some of your 
problems than you have ever gotten before.
In addition to that, we are strengthen­
ing the technical staff. That is a hard 
thing to do but we are giving them as 
many more people as we can and are 
streamlining procedures so that we can 
get those cases cleared through the techni­
cal staff much more quickly in the future 
than we ever have in the past. The trouble 
is that there is a big backlog there and it 
will be some months before we get down 
to the working level that we hope to main­
tain in the future. We are encouraging 
informal conferences on the field level. By 
that I mean that we are instructing our 
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officers to hold informal conferences at the 
group chief’s level within the agent’s office. 
We have discovered that oftentimes some of 
the failures of Internal Revenue agents to 
complete a case or to get an agreement 
either through additional proposed assess­
ment or a refund arise from pure per­
sonality reasons or a possible misunder­
standing of the statutes and regulations 
involved on the part of the agent—some­
times on the part of the taxpayer—so we 
are, in those cases, requiring the group 
chief to hold an informal conference with 
the taxpayer and his representatives and 
the agent in an attempt close that case 
before it ever gets to the agent’s office. 
It is paying big dividends in some 
parts of the country. I think it is a step 
in the right direction and I think that 
after you have sat in on a few of those 
conferences you will begin to think so 
yourselves. At any rate, it is a step towards 
reducing the work load in the Bureau so 
that we can cut down this time lag.
Now we come to the part where we 
need your help. We should like to dis­
courage the postponement of conferences 
once set, in the agent’s offices or the 
technical staff or anywhere else. Once a 
conference is set, the conferree on our 
side of the case must come up to date on 
it, must be ready for the conference. You 
also must be ready for the conference. If 
for some reason the conference must be 
postponed, the day is lost for the conferree. 
On the day set aside for the case he must 
put it aside and go to work on other cases. 
Whenever another conference is set he has 
all that work to do over again. We should 
like your cooperation in eliminating, so far 
as possible, the postponement of formal 
conferences set in our agents’ and techni­
cal staff offices.
I have mentioned that one of the reasons 
for encouraging informal field con­
ferences has been personality clashes. Of 
course, there are two sides to the question. 
I have known accountants, and so have 
you, who were so cantankerous that nobody 
could do business with them. They are al­
ways right. They are the last word. No­
body can do business with them. I know, 
thank heaven, only one or two. I also 
know Internal Revenue agents who have 
been so cast in iron that they cannot see 
but one side of the picture, and who have 
the habit of saying, “I won’t allow this,” 
and “I won’t allow that;” “Well, that has 
nothing to do with it.” I am trying to eli­
minate that frame of mind in our field 
people, but bear in mind that all of us are 
human beings. I think that after a meeting 
that I shall have in the Bureau, of the heads 
of all our field offices next week, that some 
of my policies will begin to spread over the 
country as they have already spread over 
Texas, and I feel that we shall have a 
much happier relationship. So I plead 
with you, do your part and we shall do 
ours. We do not want in the Internal 
Revenue Service any arbitrary, unsettled 
people. If you know of any such people, 
it is your duty to help us straighten the 
matter out.
Another mutual problem that we have 
is the terrific peak load periods that strike 
you and us, of course, at the same time. I 
should like to ask that you help us as 
much as you can in leveling out those 
peak load periods. The biggest one, of 
course, is the March 15 period. There is 
nothing much that we can do to take off 
the terrific load that actually hits at mid­
night on March 15, except to encourage 
people to file at the earliest possible date. 
That is not hard to do where they have 
money coming back. It is pretty hard to 
do when they owe it. But if you will urge 
your clients to get their returns in at the 
earliest possible date, it will be a tremen­
dous help to us. On the other hand, we 
know that you are burdened down and 
that there is no accountant with any 
appreciable amount of business who can 
possibly do all the work he is required to 
do between January 1 and March 15. We 
know you have to have extensions and we 
want to give them to you, will give them to 
you, but you can lessen our work if you 
will stop asking for short extensions.
I don’t like to see our collectors grant 
even 30 and 60-day extensions. If you are 
going to ask for an extension, ask for 90 
days, and if you can file a return earlier, 
do it. But if you ask for a 30-day extension 
and can’t do it, you ask for another and 
then another which gives you 90 days any­
how but we have three clerical jobs issu­
ing the three extensions. My policy as 
Collector was, and it will be the 
policy of all Collectors, that when 
you write for an extension you are going 
to get 90 days whether you ask for it or 
not. That eliminates, as I said, a tremen­
dous amount of clerical work in the col­
lector’s offices. I should like to tell you 
that that can be put on a more informal 
basis but you know as well as I that the 
value of these extension letters is 
negligible in the year a return is filed but 
they may be of considerable value in later 
years to establish the fact that the return 
was filed under an extension, even though 
the copy of the extension may have been 
lost from the return. So help us out in that 
way. Don’t ask for those short extensions 
just because you think it is easier to get a 
30-day one than it is a 90. It isn’t.
I have not attempted to cover all the 
problems that face us mutually. I have just 
merely touched on them so that you and 
I could get to know each other better and 
perhaps think along the same lines.
I want to leave that field for a minute 
and go to one that is still more serious 
than anything we have mentioned yet.
I am not a politician. I know nothing 
about politics, I care nothing about 
politics, I never have, and I never will.
There is no man in the United States 
more anxious to see the integrity of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue unchallenged 
than I, and I can assure you that any 
place I find it challenged, lightning will 
strike just as it struck in California a 
couple of weeks ago.
The Bureau is paying the penalty for 
the acts of some collectors of Internal 
Revenue. That is going to stop. I can 
assure you very, very conscientiously 
that it is going to stop. The Presi­
dent has told me many times personally to 
do whatever I thought was necessary to 
correct that situation. There are going to 
be no politics in the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue from now on.
Now it is time for your part of it. No 
deputy collector and no Internal Revenue 
agent who has gotten into trouble so far, 
that I know anything about, got into it 
by himself. Not one of them. It is a two- 




Status of over-ceiling payments in com­
puting taxable income.
With the renewal of price controls re­
newed importance attaches to the income 
tax status of payments which exceed ceil­
ing prices. The question presented is 
whether such over-ceiling payments con­
stitute allowable deductions and whether 
and to what extent such expenditures are 
deductible in computing taxable income.
HAL CANARY
There seems to be no question but that 
over-ceiling payments may be properly dis­
allowed by the Commissioner as deductions 
from gross income in arriving at taxable 
income. That point does not seem to have 
been contested by any of the taxpayers 
penalized under Regulations 111, Section 
29.23(a) (16), or I.T. 3724.
But the question has arisen when the 
over-ceiling payments were included as a 
part of the cost of goods sold, rather than 
as a deduction from gross income in ar­
riving at net taxable income.
This issue was first handled by the Tax 
Court in the case of Lela Sullenger, 11 
T.C. 1076, and it was held that over-ceil­
ing payments for meat were a part of the 
cost of goods sold, and as such were not 
deductions allowable by legislative grace, 
but were capital, the taxation of which 
was not authorized by the 16th amend­
ment to the constitution. The Commission­
er’s appeal to the Circuit Court for the 
Fifth Circuit was dismissed early in 1950.
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The Commissioner has carried several 
other cases on the same question to the 
Tax Court, has invariably lost where over­
ceiling prices were paid for merchandise 
for resale, and has also invariably ap­
pealed the cases to the Circuit Courts.
Some of the tax commentators pointed 
out at the time the Sullenger decision was 
handed down (Woman CPA, February, 
1949), that since the Tax Court had de­
cided that neither Congress nor the Com­
missioner have power to deny any part of 
the taxpayer’s cost of goods sold in arriv­
ing at taxable income, the way might be 
open to the inclusion in the cost of goods 
sold of wages paid in contravention of 
wage stabilization regulations, where the 
wages constituted direct manufacturing 
costs.
This second issue has now been decided 
by the Tax Court in Weather-Seal Mfg. 
Co., 16 T.C. . . ., No. 158, in a decision 
adverse to the taxpayer and inconsistent 
with its decision in the Sullenger case. 
The former case is now on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In the Weather-Seal case, the Court rea­
soned that salaries and wages are allow­
able under Section 23 of the Code only 
when reasonable in amount, and that 
wages paid at over-ceiling rates are clearly 
unreasonable. It did not explain the dis­
allowance of the entire wage so paid, 
rather than only the unreasonable portion, 
as is customary.
The Court also failed to note that if 
wages are deductible under Section 23, 
they are deductible from gross income, 
and that gross income is gross receipts 
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less cost of goods sold, which cost in­
cluded, among other things, the cost of 
direct labor. Nor did the Court explain 
how the taxpayer’s inventory, computed at 
cost, and including direct labor, in accord­
ance with Section 29.22(c) (3) of the 
Regulations, should be reduced.
In the Sullenger case the Tax Court was 
not greatly concerned with the public 
good, but having since then been affirmed 
in the case of the optician who paid physi­
cians “kick-backs” not illegally, but to the 
detriment of the public good, it became 
more concerned with the morals of the 
matter and cited that case (Thos. B. Lilly, 
188 F. (2d) 269, affirming 14 T.C. 1066) 
in the Weather-Seal decision. Some day the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue may follow 
that line of reasoning to the point where 
it will attempt to deny as a deduction from 
gross receipts cost of liquor purchased for 
resale by bootleggers in dry states, as con­
trary to public good.
At this time, if the taxpayer is to pre­
vail on issues of this type it will have to 
be on the question of constitutionality, and 
he cannot be sure until the Appellate 
Court has heard the Weather-Seal case.
Should capital-gains benefits be claimed by licensor under exclusive license?
In the case of Myers, 6 T.C. 258, and numerous subsequent decisions, it has been 
consistently held that proceeds received by an amateur inventor under an exclusive 
license to make use and sell products embodying his invention constitute capital 
gains. The Commissioner’s acquiescence in the Myers case established this as a recog­
nizable precedent for the field offices of the Treasury. However, in March, 1950, the 
Treasury promulgated Mim. 6490 withdrawing such acquiescence. The field offices 
had previously ceased following the Myers case, apparently under specific instructions 
from the Commissioner’s office. At the time of promulgating Mim. 6490 the Treas­
ury was active in developing a provision for legislation to conform with the procedure 
stated in that mimeograph and such provision was included in the Revenue Bill of 
1950. The provision was eliminated from the bill, although the corresponding provi­
sions relating to copyrights and artistic compositions were left in the bill and became 
enacted into law.
What procedure should be followed by 
assuming that he holds the type of license 
RUSSELL S. BOCK
I believe that an amateur inventor who 
receives in 1951 so-called “royalty” in­
come of the type involved in the Myers 
case should claim capital gain treatment.
The Myers case (6 T.C. 258) involved 
an exclusive license to make, use, and sell 
the patented articles. The courts have con­
sistently held that such a license is in sub­
stance a sale and should be so treated for 
tax purposes. The Treasury originally ac­
quiesced in the Myers case, but in March, 
1950, issued Mim. 6490 which withdrew 
the acquiescence and substituted a non­
acquiescence. Mim. 6490 further pro­
claimed the Treasury’s future policy of 
denying capital-gains treatment on all in­
come of this general type, regardless of 
an amateur inventor for the year 1951, 
involved in the Myers case?
the form of contract. During its considera­
tion of the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress 
gave some indication that it did not sym­
pathize with the Treasury’s attitude when 
the Senate eliminated a provision that 
would have treated as ordinary income 
any gain on the sale of a patent. Thus the 
Treasury’s position seems to be contrary to 
the attitude of Congress as well as that of 
the courts. Under these circumstances, so 
long as there is enough involved to make 
it worth while to litigate the matter, I be­
lieve that the inventor would be well ad­
vised to claim capital-gains benefits, until 
such time as the question of proper treat­
ment of such income is finally settled.
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What procedure is applicable to professional fee-splitting?
The Treasury agents are actively following the Tax Court’s decision in the Lilly 
case (14 T.C. 1066) and denying deductions by surgeons for the portion of their fees 
paid over to other physicians who are instrumental in causing patients to use the 
services of the surgeons.
To what extent is this procedure applicable? Is there any danger to lawyers and 
accountants in similar forwarding fee? The Institute recognizes the propriety of a 
forwarding fee and fee-splitting seems to be quite well recognized among attorneys.
What action, if any, can be taken by doctors to overcome the inequitable tax bur­
den of such disallowances?
W. WALLER GROGAN
In view of the case of Thomas B. Lilly, 
Helen W. Lilly, 14 T.C. 1066, 1950, af­
firmed C.C.A. 4 (1951) 188 F.2d 269, cer­
tiorari granted October 8, 1951, is there 
any danger to lawyers and accountants in 
the disallowance of the deduction of for­
warding fees? What action, if any, can be 
taken by doctors to overcome the in­
equitable tax burden of such disallow­
ances?
I believe that many tax practitioners 
feel that the Tax Court has done some 
“legislating” in the Lilly case. This case 
appears to be the first instance of the dis­
allowance of a business deduction because 
it opposes public policy—stemming from 
a purely ethical situation. In the Lilly 
case, so-called “kick-backs” paid to ocu­
lists by an optical firm were denied as 
“ordinary and necessary business deduc­
tions” on the grounds that they violated 
public policy. How actively the treasury 
agents may be following this case is a 
matter of conjecture—I am told that in 
the Louisville office of the agent in charge 
none are presently pending. However, I 
fully expect the Bureau to question and 
to disallow in certain instances deductions 
claimed in the case of a surgeon who has 
paid over a fee to the physician who re­
fers the patient to him. By whatever name 
it may be called, it is merely another form 
of “fee-splitting.” While fee-splitting in 
some form may be quite prevalent among 
members of both the accounting and legal 
professions, I believe that it is neverthe­
less frowned upon and that nowhere is it 
specifically “approved.”
In the instance of the surgeon to whom 
a patient is referred by the physician, I 
believe that in order to safeguard the de­
duction of a fee paid to the physician, the 
physician should render a “service”; i.e., 
he should be present, and, if necessary, 
actually assist the surgeon in the operating 
room. While it is true that his presence is 
obviously intended to be of benefit to the 
patient, surely it is a plausible argument 
for the surgeon to advance in support of 
his deduction. I fully expect to see the 
Bureau disallow some deductions of this 
nature on the grounds that no service 
whatever was rendered, there was no com­
pulsion to pay the physician, and lastly, 
if necessary, to extend this theory on the 
grounds of the Lilly case.
The taxpayer’s position in this case was 
simply that no public policy was violated 
by these (oral) contracts—that there was 
no statutory law or rules of professional 
conduct condemning this practice. Tax­
payer further argued that the practice did 
not increase the cost of the prescribed eye­
glasses and that the practice of secret kick- 
backs was so common and so widespread 
that such payments must be deductible as 
ordinary and necessary. This failed to 
impress the Tax Court (Judge Leech) and 
likewise the Fourth Circuit (Judge Dobie).
The Tax Court opinion states, “The ab­
sence of constitutional or statutory law or 
rules of professional conduct condemning 
this particular practice is not enough to 
support petitioner’s position.” And with 
this the Court proceeds to legislate. The 
opinion further stated, “It must be remem­
bered that the fundamental principle with 
which we are dealing here is not that of 
the relationship between the parties to an 
ordinary commercial transaction. We are 
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concerned in this case with the relation­
ship between physicians and their pa­
tients.” At this point it seems difficult to 
rationalize how this “relationship” can be 
against “public policy.” The dissenting 
opinion by Judge Arundell and the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion offer various descriptions 
of the phrase “public policy.” Judge Arun­
dell’s dissenting opinion gives the real 
meat of the situation when he states 
that “I am disturbed ... by the ma­
jority opinion that a commission paid 
by an optician to a doctor . . . may 
not be deducted as an ordinary and 
necessary expense on the ground that 
this practice ... is unethical and con­
trary to public policy.” He further states 
as to revenue statutes, “They are none too 
squeamish about how the income to be 
taxed was realized. The profits of illegal 
businesses are taxed the same as the profits 
of legitimate businesses, and, as the tax 
is based on net income rather than gross 
income, the expenses incurred in carrying 
on of the illegal business have been gen­
erally allowed, as the purpose of the tax 
laws is not to penalize a business because 
it is one on which the law frowns” (Com­
missioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467). 
Heretofore, the public policy theory to 
overcome the “ordinary and necessary” 
requirement has prevailed in situations in­
volving agents or employees of a govern­
ment or its instrumentality—or has in­
volved deductions of sums paid as bribes 
or sums paid to perform an act specifically 
forbidden by law, which courts have ob­
viously balked at permitting. Judge Arun­
dell’s dissent points out that “the Tax 
Court should be reluctant to undertake the 
determination of the question of what is 
and what is not contrary to public policy, 
both for the United States and for each of 
the forty-eight states where the act con­
demned as against public policy is not one 
shown to be in violation of any law of the 
land. This court in the past has taken the 
position that it does not possess the right 
to condemn undesirable trade practices as 
being against public policy, etc.” Judge 
Arundell’s gem is “What are deductible 
items should be known to a taxpayer with 
reasonable certainty under our income tax 
system.” The dissent interestingly points 
out that the Commissioner does not claim 
that “expenditures of this sort fall without 
the purview of this statute, and in his 
brief in this case he does not argue that 
the agreements between petitioner and the 
doctors were contrary to public policy, 
but, rather, that the payments to the doc­
tors are not ordinary and necessary ex­
penses in that they were voluntary and 
incident to an unethical practice.”
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion condemned 
the practice of kick-backs in some very 
sharply worded statements holding that 
the kick-backs “corrupt the fiduciary re­
lationship between physicians and patients 
and result in a violation of the duty of 
loyalty, they are opposed to public policy 
and, therefore, are not deductible as ‘or­
dinary and necessary’ business expenses.” 
The Court made itself crystal clear in its 
statement, “We certainly will not lend the 
force of any opinion of this court to sanc­
tion, as an ordinary and necessary expense 
of the optician’s business, the making and 
carrying out of such unconscionable and 
reprehensible contracts for secret kick- 
backs to a doctor.”
The Circuit Court’s opinion seems to 
have its fundamental premise that it is 
immaterial that the question may be one 
of ethics rather than of law. Pursuing this 
literal statement, it is not difficult to envi­
sion the disallowance by the Commissioner 
of fee-splitting among physicians or other 
professional men. However, this theory is 
certainly extending the more commercial 
situation existing in the Lilly case and I 
do not believe that the courts will follow 
the Lilly case in a situation among mem­
bers of a profession on the grounds that 
“fee-splitting” is against policy.
The problem incident to these “kick- 
backs”—which are no more than commis­
sions paid for securing customers—should 
be compared with the Tax Court’s hold­
ing in the cases involving “black market” 
purchases—admittedly paid in violation of 
OPA ceiling prices. The leading case is 
Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948), Com­
missioner’s appeal dismissed, CCA 5, 
2/20/50, which involved the deduction 
from gross receipts (as cost of goods sold) 
the purchase of meats in OPA prices, and 
the following exceeding T.C. Memo De­
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cisions were decided on the authority of 
the Sullenger case Clara Eugenia Piper, 
Ethel L. Couch (both involving over-ceil­
ing purchases of used automobiles), W. 
Guminski (meat) and Colonial Rubber 
Company, side payments in purchase of 
used tires in excess of OPA ceilings. The 
opinion in Sullenger, supra, observes that 
Section 23 makes no provision for the cost 
of goods sold but that the Commissioner 
has recognized “as indeed he must to stay 
within the Constitution, that the cost of 
goods sold must be deducted from gross 
receipts in order to arrive at gross in­
come.” Judge Disney, dissents in this case 
stating, inter alia, “Why an expenditure in 
contravention of law, and of public policy, 
should be permitted subtraction and thus 
affect such taxation, is difficult to under­
stand. On the broad question of public 
policy here involved, I think there is no 
sound reason to distinguish the present 
situation from those above covered.” (Em­
phasis supplied.)
Another decision to be observed in con­
nection with this subject is Jerry Rossman 
Corporation v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d, 
711, C.C.A. 2, 1949, reversing 10 T.C. 468, 
involving the deductibility of a penalty, 
voluntarily paid to the Office of Price Ad­
ministration, as an “ordinary and neces­
sary business expense.” The opinion, Judge 
L. Hand, states, among other things, that 
it is not a penalty, and “Second, we say 
that, even if it was the payment of a ‘pen­
alty,’ that is not a ‘rigid criterion’ of its 
deductibility. Third, we say that there was 
positive and compelling evidence that to 
allow such a deduction would not ‘frus­
trate’ the policies of the underlying act.”
Under what circumstances are the opening inventory and accounts receivable to be 
included in computing income upon a change in the income-tax accounting method 
to give effect to inventories and receivables (and payables)?
Another question which is being given close scrutiny by examining revenue agents 
is that which arises when income is first computed by using inventories and receiv­
ables following years in which such items were disregarded. The question of when the 
opening inventory is to be included or disregarded upon changing accounting method 
to reflect inventories where they have not been used previously is quite confusing 
under the decisions of the Tax Court. The procedure recognized by the Tax Court 
seems to be as summarized below:
1. If the books have been kept on the cash basis but the accrual method is required 
to reflect the income correctly, the opening inventory is disregarded for the year in 
which the accrual method is first used. Z. W. Koby, 14 T.C. 1103.
2. If the books are kept on the accrual basis except that inventories have not been 
used, it appears that the Commissioner may not require the opening inventory to be 
disregarded if he insists upon use of the closing inventory. Mnookin’s Estate, 184 F. 
(2d) 89, aff. 12 T.C. 744; Robert G. Frame, 16 T.C. No. 73.
Some weight seems to be given by the Tax Court to the identity of the side initiat­
ing the action for use of inventories after they have previously not been used. Tax­
payers have lost in attempting to switch to the use of inventories by using the open­
ing inventory for the year of change.
In the case of Cornelius J. Dwyer, decided June 29, 1951 (CCH Dec. 18, 426(m)), 
the Commissioner was sustained in requiring the use of the accrual method for a 
hotel and tavern business where sale of merchandise was an income-producing factor 
but sustained the taxpayer in giving effect to the opening inventory where inven­
tories had been taken and were recorded and available.
The subject is discussed in an article on page 109 of Research Institute Taxation 
Report of July 5, 1951, under caption “Penalty for Wrong Accounting Method.”
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The Tax Court seems to give considerable weight to the method followed in keep­
ing the books. In the case of Carver, 10 T.C. 171, aff. 175 F.2d 29, Carver had 
kept his books on a cash basis for 16 years and then changed to the accrual basis. 
The Court upheld the Commissioner in disregarding the opening inventory for the 
year of the change. It would appear that if the taxpayer has used inventories in his 
books but not in his tax return, the Commissioner would be denied the authority to 
disregard the opening inventory if the Commissioner changes the method of account­
ing to reflect inventories in accordance with the method used in the books. Also, if 
the taxpayer used an inventory in his books and tax returns but used an incorrect 
method of computing such inventories, the Tax Court might uphold the taxpayer in 
using the correct opening inventory for the year of correction, particularly if the 
Commissioner was the party who required the correction.
WILLIAM H. WESTPHAL
A taxpayer is often required to use the 
accrual method of accounting because it 
more accurately reflects taxable net in­
come, although the books of account are 
kept on a cash or hybrid basis. These are 
usually cases in which inventories and 
accounts receivable are material income­
producing factors in which the Regula­
tions and decided cases require the use of 
the accrual method. On the other hand, 
the taxpayer’s books may be properly 
kept on the accrual basis while he erro­
neously reports income in his return on 
a cash basis. What is the result in the 
event the Commissioner examines the ques­
tion after the taxpayer had been report­
ing erroneously on a cash or hybrid basis 
for several years and decides that he 
should be on the accrual basis? Under 
such circumstances, how should the open­
ing inventories and accounts receivable at 
the beginning of the year be handled?
Actually, by setting up the opening in­
ventories and accounts receivable in the 
year of the change, the taxpayer succeeds 
in eliminating this amount from taxable 
net income entirely. On the other hand, 
setting up the opening accounts payable re­
sults in eliminating deductions that would 
otherwise be allowed and this treatment 
of the liabilities prevents the taxpayer 
from ever being able to obtain this deduc­
tion.
The decision in the case of Wm. Hardy, 
17 A.F.T.R. 615, decided by the Second 
Circuit, aroused considerable interest in 
this question. Here a taxpayer changed 
his books to the accrual basis and con­
tinued to prepare tax returns on the cash 
basis. The Commissioner decided that the 
taxpayer should report on the accrual 
basis because of the nature of his busi­
ness, in which inventories and accounts 
receivable were material income-producing 
factors. In effecting the correction of the 
returns to the accrual basis, the method 
followed by the taxpayer in keeping his 
books, he did not adjust the items of ac­
crual at the beginning of the year of 
change, but only at the end. The result of 
this action was to pick up, in the year of 
the change, the entire accrual of income 
over the years.
A similar result followed in the case of 
Carver, 10 T.C. 171, aff. 173 F2d 29, 
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. In this case 
the books were likewise changed from a 
cash to an accrual basis, but the returns 
were filed on the cash basis, and the 
change was made entirely within one year 
by the Commissioner. To the same effect 
were other cases in point, Michael Lovall, 
Dec. 17, 790 (M) Plantea, Dec. 13, 946 
(M), and Z. W. Koby, 14 T.C. 1103.
However, in the case of Mnookin’s Es­
tate, 184 F2d 89, aff. 12 T.C. 744, a 
different result obtained. Here the tax­
payer was on the accrual basis on all 
items with the exception of credit sales, 
which he reported on a cash basis. The 
Court held that the Commissioner could 
not include in income of the year of the 
change the opening accounts receivable 
and disallow the beginning inventory. The 
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reason this was not permitted was that 
the taxpayer had not changed a method 
of accounting, but it was merely necessary 
that a correction be made in a consistently 
followed method.
Also, in the case of Cornelius J. Dwyer, 
Dec. 18, 426 (M) the Commissioner, while 
upheld in requiring the taxpayer to in­
clude inventories in computing net income, 
erred in failing to allow a beginning in­
ventory as a deduction, since there was 
no change in method of accounting.
There seems to be much confusion in 
the cases on this subject, but the following 
principle appears to emerge therefrom; if 
the taxpayer must be changed from one 
method to another, the cash basis to the 
accrual basis because the taxpayer had 
been reporting by following the wrong 
method, the changes would be made in 
the closing inventories, receivables, and 
payables, and not in the corresponding 
opening items.
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer re­
ports on the accrual basis and had been 
consistently doing so, but omits an item 
of consequence that should be taken into 
consideration, the Commissioner must ef­
fect his correction in the opening inven­
tory, receivables, or payables, if such a 
correction is indicated therein. This is an 
oversimplification, however, and is subject 
to certain modifications and qualifications.
In the case of an incomplete reporting 
on the accrual basis, there may be some 
difference in the result if the taxpayer him­
self seeks to correct the errors. His very 
action in doing so at the time the return 
is prepared may indicate that he clearly 
understands that preceding years, likewise, 
should have been adjusted. It will, there­
fore, be more difficult to convince the gov­
ernment that his presentation of the facts 
of which he has knowledge has been com­
plete and it may be contended that the 
Commissioner has relied upon the tax­
payer’s representations to his detriment. 
Under such circumstances, it is possible 
that the government may successfully re­
quire that the opening inventory, or receiv­
ables, be omitted and the entire income 
adjustment be made in the year of cor­
rection.
Since the penalty of a changeover from 
a cash to an accrual basis may be ex­
tremely severe if large receivables and in­
ventories have been built up, several 
alternatives may suggest themselves in 
settling these cases administratively. The 
question has often arisen concerning 
whether or not Section 3801 can be ap­
plied. There is considerable doubt that an 
inconsistent position has been taken in 
such a manner that a correction may be 
effected by the taxpayer through the in­
vocation of this section. It is possible, how­
ever, if the results of the abrupt change- 
over are seriously inequitable, that an 
equity settlement can be agreed to that 
will result in a tax substantially as large 
as the amount that would have been paid 
had the taxpayer reported correctly on 
the accrual basis for all years involved, 
plus interest on this theoretical tax.
Also, in the case of a corporation in 
excess-profits tax, the provisions of Sec. 
456 pertaining to abnormal income should 
be thoroughly explored in the year of 
the changeover. It appears that it may be 
reasoned soundly that such an adjustment 
would represent abnormal income of a 
type applicable to preceding years, and 
not properly subject to excess-profits tax.
What is the situation with respect to capital gains on the sale of livestock used for 
breeding or dairy purposes?
WALTER M. BURY
There has been considerable litigation 
during the past few years as to the tax­
ability of gains on the sale of breeding or 
dairy stock of farmers, particularly in 
those instances in which the sale of such 
animals constitute a long-term capital­
gain transaction under section 117(j) of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 117(j) 
was added to the Code in 1942 and pro­
vided that the capital-gains rates would 
apply to gains on sale of property used 
in the trade or business of a taxpayer 
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which was of a character subject to the 
allowance for depreciation and to real 
property held for more than six months 
which is not property of a kind which 
would properly be includible in the inven­
tory of a taxpayer if on hand at the close 
of the taxable year, or property which is 
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale 
to customers in the ordinary course of his 
trade or business. Livestock used for 
draft, breeding, or dairy purposes and 
held over six months is among the kind 
of assets to which section 117(j) applies.
There are certain allowable procedures, 
however, with respect to reporting farm 
income for tax purposes, that are peculiar 
to farm income accounting. One of these 
is that a farmer reporting income on the 
accrual basis can carry as inventory ani­
mals which are used for dairy or breeding 
purposes, whether purchased or raised, 
even though such animals constitute cap­
ital assets and are subject to the allow­
ance for depreciation. The other one is 
that a farmer is allowed to use the cash 
receipts and disbursements basis for re­
porting his income and does not have 
to recognize as inventory the animals 
raised by him. Expenses of raising such 
animals are allowed as a deduction when 
paid, and income is recognized when the 
sales proceeds are received. As a result 
animals raised for breeding or dairy pur­
poses are carried at no value and have 
a zero basis for computing gain or loss.
The Treasury Department early recog­
nized these peculiarities of farm account­
ing when it issued I.T. 3666, 1944 CB 270, 
which provided that any livestock used 
for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes, ir­
respective of whether such livestock was 
raised or otherwise acquired, is property 
used in the trade or business, of a char­
acter which is subject to the allowance for 
depreciation and that this was equally 
true whether the farmer keeps his books 
and files his returns upon the cash receipts 
and disbursement basis or upon the ac­
crual basis. The Tax Court of the United 
States in Isaac Emerson, 12 T.C. 875, was 
of the same opinion. Accordingly, livestock 
held over six months and used for breed­
ing or dairy purposes should have the 
benefits of section 117 (j) whether such 
livestock was raised or purchased, whether 
it was carried on the books as an inven­
tory asset or a capital asset or, in the 
case of a farmer on the cash basis with 
respect to raised livestock which has a 
zero basis.
The Commissioner’s main ruling on this 
question, I.T. 3712, 1945 CB 176, held, in 
effect, that breeding or dairy animals were 
not section 117 (j) assets but rather that 
the breeding and dairy herd as a whole 
constituted such an asset and that only 
gain on sales which resulted in a net 
decrease in the herd after considering the 
year’s replacements would constitute sec­
tion 117(j) gains.
This ruling was overruled in March of 
1949 by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in Albright v. U. S., 173 
F2d 339, which held that gains on sale 
of cattle used for breeding or dairy pur­
poses and hogs used for breeding pur­
poses and held over six months are taxable 
as capital gains pursuant to section 117 
(j) of the Code. The Tax Court then 
handed down several decisions on this is­
sue in favor of the taxpayer: Isaac Em­
merson, supra, Leslie S. Oberg, 8 TCM 
544, Fawn Lake Ranch Company, 12 T.C. 
1139, Charles 0. Fritz, 9 TCM 81, and 
others. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit has joined the Eighth Cir­
cuit and the Tax Court in holding against 
the Commissioner on this issue in U. S. 
v. John M. Bennett et al, 186 F2d 407.
On April 18, 1951, the Commissioner 
issued Income Tax Release No. 3 wherein 
he reconsidered his former position and 
announced that the following principles 
will govern the treatment of sales of dairy 
and breeding animals:
“If the animal is used for draft or dairy 
purposes—or in the case of a breeding 
animal, if the practice of the taxpayer is 
to hold such animals for substantially 
their full period of usefulness—the ani­
mal will be regarded, prima facie, as used 
in the business of the taxpayer for the 
purposes of section 117(j) of the Code.
“If the practice of the taxpayer is to 
sell breeding animals before they have 
served substantially their periods of use­
fulness, such animals will be regarded, 
prima facie, as held primarily for sale to 
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customers in the ordinary course of the 
taxpayer’s business, and not as property 
used in his business.
“Under these principles, dairy or breed­
ing cattle, horses, etc., will ordinarily 
qualify as property used in the business, 
and gain or loss on their sale will qualify 
for the special treatment provided in sec­
tion 117(j) of the Code. Animals which 
are used only temporarily as breeders or 
producers, including, ordinarily, hogs, 
chickens, turkeys, etc., will not be re­
garded as qualifying for such treatment.” 
This information release was followed on 
June 27, 1951, by Mimeograph 6660 which 
revoked LT. 3666, supra, and LT. 3712, 
supra, and stated the new position of the 
Bureau as follows:
“It is the present position of the Bureau 
that gains derived from the sale of dairy, 
draft, or breeding animals are to be rec­
ognized as coming within the purview of 
section 117(j) of the Code if the taxpayer 
establishes that the particular animals 
sold were actually used for dairy, draft, or 
breeding purposes for substantially their 
full period of usefulness. If such animals 
are sold prior to such full period of useful­
ness, the taxpayer must show that they 
were added to the herd for substantial use 
in such herd and not temporarily with the 
object in view of an early sale. Gains de­
rived from the sale of breeding animals 
which were used for the production of 
only one offspring or litter of offspring 
will not be subject to the capital-gains 
treatment prescribed by section 117(j) of 
the Code. Animals which are used only 
temporarily as breeders or producers, in­
cluding ordinarily hogs, chickens, and 
turkeys, will not be subject to the capital­
gains treatment prescribed by section 
117(j).”
The Commissioner agrees with the 
principle of the Albright case that gain 
on sale of livestock used for draft, breed­
ing, or dairy purposes is capital gain pur­
suant to section 117(j). However, the 
Commissioner requires that in order to 
qualify as section 117(j) assets such ani­
mals must be used for draft, breeding, or 
dairy purposes for substantially their full 
period of usefulness or that they must be 
added to the herd for substantial use in 
the herd and not temporarily with the 
object in view of an early sale. Apparently, 
the Commissioner will allow section 117 
(j) treatment of gains on usual or liqui­
dating sales of culls from the dairy or 
breeding herd. He, however, will not al­
low a farmer to hold livestock until they 
produce one offspring before selling them 
and thus obtain capital-gains treatment.
There is judicial support for the Com­
missioner’s position in Leonard C. Kline 
et al v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 998. In that 
case petitioners who operated primarily 
a feeder ranch, purchased as feeder cattle 
substantial numbers of Hereford cows 
which had been bred prior to or after pur­
chase. It was the petitioner’s intention to 
hold the cows until after they had pro­
duced a crop of calves and then sell them 
as beef cattle. In disallowing section 
117(j) treatment of the gain on the sale 
of these cows, the Tax Court concluded 
that the cows were primarily held for 
sale to customers and that purchasing 
the cows with the intention of harvesting 
a single crop of calves from them before 
putting them on the beef market did not 
establish the cows as breeders as dis­
tinguished from feeder cattle. The Court 
distinguished the case from Albright, 
supra, wherein capital gain was allowed 
on sows which had produced only one 
litter of pigs, by holding that Albright 
followed a trade practice in the hog in­
dustry, whereas there was no evidence in 
the Kline case that there is or has ever 
been any common practice in the cattle 
industry of regularly selling cows from a 
breeding herd on the beef market after 
they had produced one calf.
Two recent Tax Court decisions have 
ruled on the difficult question of deter­
mining when a young animal becomes part 
of the breeding herd. In the typical reg­
istered cattle breeding operation young 
calves are not just added to the breeding 
herd and retained for their substantially 
full production period. The more usual 
practice is to sell some of the calves dur­
ing their first year, some during their 
second year, and others after they have 
produced one or two calves. Only by such 
gradual process of elimination are the 
cows selected which are retained for their 
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full productive period. The Commissioner’s 
mimeograph ruling indicates that if the 
taxpayer can show that the animal was 
added to the herd for substantial use in 
the herd, gain on sale of such an animal 
prior to its full period of usefulness can 
qualify as a section 117(j) gain.
In Walter S. Fox v. Commissioner, 16 
T.C. 854, promulgated April 20, 1951, 
the Tax Court held that in the case 
of a registered Aberdeen-Angus cattle op­
eration, heifers raised, registered, and 
sold by petitioners before they dropped 
a calf should not be regarded as part of 
the breeding herd and those animals that 
dropped a calf while still owned by the 
petitioners should be regarded as part of 
that herd. Inasmuch as the evidence in 
the case did not permit definite classifica­
tion for each animal sold, the Tax Court 
made a determination based on all evi­
dence that registered heifers 26 months 
old or over and registered bulls 36 months 
old or over when sold shall be treated as 
having been part of the breeding herd.
In A. Harold Schmidt et al v. Commis­
sioner, (CCH Dec. 18,353(M) entered 
May 31, 1951) the petitioners also main­
tained a registered herd of purebred Aber­
deen-Angus cattle. Following the Fox case, 
supra, and applying the formula used 
therein to the evidence of the case the 
Tax Court held that only animals over 
24 months of age when sold are to be 
considered as having been part of the 
breeding herd.
In Joy G. Miller et al v. U. S. (U. S. 
District Court, District of Nebraska, Lin­
coln Division, No. 14-50 Civil, February 
19, 1951) the Court held that in a ranch 
operation consisting of breeding and rais­
ing of beef cattle, gains on sale of heifers 
which had been introduced to the breed­
ing herd at fourteen months of age and 
proved unsatisfactory for breeding pur­
poses, were capital gains. This case is 
more liberal than the above cases but the 
taxpayer was able to prove to the satis­
faction of the court that the animals had 
been retained for breeding purposes.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the 
courts and the Commissioner agree that 
animals used for draft, dairy, or breeding 
purposes constitute section 117(j) assets. 
There is not such complete agreement as 
to when an animal becomes part of the 
breeding or dairy herd. The Commission­
er’s present position is that the animal 
must be used in the breeding or dairy herd 
for substantially its full useful period or 
that it was added to the herd with such 
intention. The courts agree, with one ex­
ception, that the production of one off­
spring qualifies a cow as a breeder. This 
would also apply to sows since using them 
for the production of only one or two 
litters is common trade practice. The ex­
ception is the Kline case, supra, in which 
it was held that feeder cattle which were 
purchased for sale but were held over 
for one crop of calves did not qualify 
as breeders.
A discussion of the situation with re­
spect to capital gains on the sale of live­
stock used for breeding or dairy purposes 
should consider pending legislation on the 
matter. The Revenue Bill of 1951 (H. R. 
4473) as reported by the Senate Finance 
Committee on September 18, 1951, pro­
vides that capital gain treatment under 
section 117(j) would be extended to live­
stock, regardless of age, held for draft, 
breeding, or dairy purposes, for a period 
of 12 months or more from date of ac­
quisition. This provision would be ap­
plicable to years beginning after December 
31, 1941, except that the extension of the 
holding period from 6 to 12 months would 
be applicable only with respect to taxable 
years beginning after December 31, 1950. 
Also with respect to taxable years begin­
ning after December 31, 1950, livestock 
would not include poultry except turkeys. 
The Senate Committee Report on the Rev­
enue Bill of 1951 states that new un­
certainties have resulted from Mimeo­
graph 6660 which the Bureau Agents 
apparently are interpreting to mean that 
only animals which have completely out­
lived their usefulness can qualify for the 
capital-gains treatment, and that under 
the Committee’s bill section 117(j) will 
apply to livestock used for draft, breed­
ing, or dairy purposes, and to turkeys 
used for breeding purposes, whether old 
or young; and the holding period will 
start at the date of acquisition, not with 
the date the animal or fowl is put to 
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such use. If this provision becomes law 
it should help to clarify the question of 
capital gains on livestock.
The effect of section 117(j) on the 
income-tax liability of farmers reporting 
income on the cash receipts and disburse­
ments basis as compared to those using 
the inventory method warrants comment. 
Can a farmer who uses the inventory meth­
od of accounting for farm animals ob­
tain as much benefit from the capital­
gains provision as a farmer who uses the 
cash basis? If the farmer is on the cash 
basis, an animal that is raised has an 
adjusted cost basis of zero and if it qual­
ifies as a capital asset, then the entire 
sales price is long-term capital gain. If 
the farmer is on the inventory basis and 
has included the animal in his inventory, 
then such amount apparently becomes the 
adjusted cost basis and reduces the amount 
of the long-term capital gain, thereby 
placing such a farmer at a disadvantage 
in comparison with a cash basis farmer.
This is a disadvantage that must be 
taken into consideration in counseling a 
farmer to adopt the accrual basis for 
income reporting. However, what can a 
farmer who already is on the inventory 
method do in order to get the maximum 
tax benefits on his sale of breeding or 
dairy stock which qualify as section 117 
(j) assets? One possibility would be to 
adopt that inventory method which would 
result in the lowest inventory value; for 
instance, a farmer using the farm-price 
inventory method could obtain permission 
to change to a unit-livestock-price method 
establishing as low a normal unit cost 
as is practicable. Another possibility is 
to retain the dairy and breeding animals 
in the inventory until they reach maturity 
and then to transfer them to a capital 
account and depreciate them. Moreover, 
all purchased dairy and breeding animals 
should be capitalized and depreciated 
rather than added to the inventory. Final­
ly, the one sure way to secure equality in 
tax on such gains between farmers using 
the two methods of accounting for farm 
income would be for a farmer using the 
accrual method to obtain permission to 
change to a cash receipts and disburse­
ments basis providing such permission 
could be obtained.
(Section 324 of the Revenue Bill of 
1951 as reported by the Senate Finance 
Committee was enacted into law as section 
324 of the Revenue Act of 1951 with the 
exception that turkeys like other poultry 
were excluded from the definition of live­
stock.)
What tax accounting procedure is applicable to payments to a corporation by an 
officer, director, or shareholder pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934?
CHARLES N. WHITEHEAD
Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 requires that profits 
from a purchase and sale of a corpora­
tion’s stock by officers, directors, or cer­
tain classes of shareholders, within a six 
months’ period be paid to the corporation. 
The purpose of this section was to remove 
the profit from speculation by insiders 
who were presumed to have access to in­
side information. The order of purchase 
and sale is unimportant; the amount to 
be paid to the corporation is the dif­
ference between the highest sale price and 
the lowest purchase price within six 
months’ period. The payment has no re­
lation to taxable income and cannot be 
based upon identification of stock sold. 
Moreover, the payment may be, and usu­
ally is, required in a year subsequent to 
the year of purchase and sale.
The tax treatment of such payments 
by the individual and by the corporation 
has never been adjudicated, nor have 
formal rulings been issued by the Bu­
reau. Interesting problems are present on 
both sides; namely, whether the payment 
is a deduction to the taxpayer and whether 
its receipt is income to the corporation.
The individual’s problem is complicated 
because the payment has no real relation 
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to taxable income reported on the sale, 
and the payment may or may not occur 
during the taxable year of sale. It would 
seem that the payment could not be an 
adjustment of the sale price or affect 
the capital gain or loss on the sale, be­
cause of the completely different basis 
of computation of the taxable gain and 
the repayment. The taxpayer will have 
sustained a capital gain or loss based on 
the sale price and cost of shares held and 
sold, and the repurchase at a different 
price can hardly affect the gain or loss 
realized for tax purposes. It seems equally 
clear that the amount paid should not be 
considered as additional cost basis of the 
shares repurchased, because it has no re­
lation to the stock repurchased. Accord­
ingly, it appears that the payment must 
be in the nature of an expense in the year 
of payment.
Assuming that the payment is an ex­
pense and that it is deductible, there 
remains the question as to whether it is 
deductible as an ordinary deduction, prob­
ably under Section 23(e), or whether it 
should be treated as a capital loss. In 
cases where the payment is made in a 
year different from the year of reporting 
the gain, the principle of the Switlik case, 
(13 T.C. 121 affd. CA-3) should be applic­
able. While the Bureau has nonacquiesced 
the Switlik case, and hence would disa­
gree with its application, the courts have 
held in similar situations that such pay­
ments result in ordinary deductions. If the 
Bureau’s interpretation of the Switlik case, 
insofar as I understand it, is considered 
applicable, the individual would be al­
lowed at most a capital loss in the year 
of repayment.
The foregoing assumes that the pay­
ment would result in some sort of a de­
duction. Apparently there have been no 
published rulings by the Treasury De­
partment on the question, but there are 
unpublished Bureau rulings to the effect 
that no deduction whatever is allowable 
to the individual on the theory that the 
payment is in the nature of a penalty and 
therefore nondeductible. Apparently this 
interpretation is being litigated in the case 
of William F. Davis, Jr. now pending be­
fore the Tax Court. It is difficult to see 
how the Bureau can contend that the pay­
ment is a penalty. As I read the law, the 
individual coming within its scope is re­
quired to pay the profit to the corpora­
tion, providing that he performs certain 
prescribed acts. The intent is to discour­
age the use of inside information for spec­
ulative purposes by removing the profit 
from such speculation, and no penalty 
other than the repayment of the money 
results from the application of the stat­
ute. Under such circumstances it seems 
that the Bureau’s theory of penalty is far­
fetched and untenable.
The situation with respect to the cor­
poration likewise has had no assistance 
from the Bureau or the courts. The cor­
responding questions are whether the re­
ceipt by the corporation is taxable as 
ordinary income, capital gain, or non- 
taxable on the theory of a capital con­
tribution or the receipt of punitive dam­
ages. Certainly the corporation has done 
nothing to earn the income; the income 
has flowed to it by reason of the inde­
pendent action of an individual. It is dif­
ficult to see how such a receipt comes 
within the scope of Section 22(a), or 
within the definition of income in such 
cases as Eisner v. Macomber (252 U.S. 
207). If it is income it would appear to 
be ordinary income, because the sale or 
exchange required for a capital gain was 
by another taxpayer. Likewise, it would 
seem to be excess-profits income unless 
it could be excluded as abnormal income 
under Section 456.
It is hard to see how the receipt can 
be classified as a capital contribution, be­
cause the individual may or may not be 
a stockholder at the time of repayment 
and there is no intent to contribute to 
capital. It has many of the attributes of 
a gift to the corporation; however, the 
lack of donative intent and the involuntary 
nature of the payment is such as to make 
the gift theory difficult to substantiate. An­
other possibility is that the receipt by 
the corporation of a penalty, assuming that 
the Bureau’s treatment of the payment as 
a penalty is correct, does not result in 
taxable income to the corporation. Cases 
involving punitive damages and receipts 
of penalties may be applicable, and in 
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those cases the courts have held that such 
damages do not constitute taxable income 
to the receiving taxpayer. (E.g. Central 
Railroad 79 Fed 2d 697, Highland Farms, 
42 B.T.A. 1314).
The situation then is one in which the 
Bureau should publish an indication of 
its position. At the present time appar­
ently the Bureau is taking the harsh posi­
tion that payments are not deductible to
the individual but constitute income to the 
corporation. Under such circumstances it 
is apparent that taxpayers must take the 
exact converse and contend that the pay­
ments are deductible as ordinary deduc­
tions, and that the corporation realizes no 
taxable income on receipt. It seems likely 
that prolonged litigation will result unless 
some rational and equitable ruling is an­
nounced by the Bureau.
What is tax accounting procedure for advertising funds which are subject to ex­
penditure by the vendee?
Some manufacturers and wholesalers are using advertising plans under which the 
customer deposits a sum for each unit of merchandise with the vendor as an adver­
tising fund. Under the terms of the contract the vendor becomes liable for an equal 
amount. The vendee has full authority to expend the funds for advertising purposes 
subject only to the requirement that the advertising must be in conformity with the 
vendor’s general policy against unethical advertising. Typical provisions covering the 
types of advertising which are ineligible for reimbursement out of such funds are 
the following:
1. Containing statements that are misleading or untruthful, regardless of intention.
2. Containing statements that are derogatory to other makes of products or to 
other manufacturers.
3. Offering company’s products for sale at other than the suggested retail selling 
prices.
4. Offering premiums in connection with sale of company’s products even though 
price of company’s products is raised to include premium. This does not apply to 
authorized combination sales of company’s products.
5. Illustrating models which are not identified by model number and retail price 
when featuring the price of another model.
6. Violating any Governmental regulations.
Such plans ordinarily provide that upon termination of the agreement between 
vendor and vendee one-half of any unexpended portion of the combined fund shall 
be distributed to the vendee and the vendor shall be released from any further 
obligation.
In the appeal of the 7-Up Company, 14 T.C. 965, the Tax Court held that sums 
deposited by customers under such a plan did not constitute income to the vendor.
Questions apparently needing clarification include the time for deduction of such 
advertising appropriations by the vendor and also by the vendee. Is the vendee 
entitled to any deduction at the time of his deposit with the vendor? And is the 
vendor entitled to a deduction for his liability to match the vendee’s deposit at the 
time of the deposit or only at the time the ultimate advertising expenses accrue?
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HAL CANARY
T
he answer to this question depends 
to some extent on whether we are 
doing the tax accounting for the manu­
facturer, the distributor, or the retailer.
In the typical case the manufacturer 
invoices the distributor for advertising on 
a per-unit basis, or sets aside a reserve 
for advertising based on the distributor’s 
purchases. In either case the funds are 
held in reserve for the distributor’s use. 
In the case of a per-unit charge to the 
distributor, the amount is sometimes 
matched by the manufacturer.
There is a little question that the 
amounts charged the distributor should 
be treated as customers’ deposits for good 
accounting and good tax accounting. 7-Up 
Company, 14 T.C. 965; Broadcast Meas­
urement Bureau, Inc., 16 T.C.----- , No.
122.
As for the reserve set aside by the 
manufacturer, good accounting practice 
and tax accounting seem to point to dif­
ferent directions. The manufacturer has 
definitely committed himself to make cer­
tain disbursements based on the sales 
made, and good accounting would require 
that the expense be taken in the year in 
which the applicable income was earned.
However, the taxing authorities can on 
occasion be very realistic, and they know 
that if the distributor’s franchise is can­
celled, the amount paid by the distributor 
will be refunded, and the amount set 
aside by the manufacturer will never be 
paid out. Consequently, for tax purposes, 
it is established that deduction may not 
be taken for reserves set up for contingen­
cies. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193.
Although some of the advertising fund, 
as well as the manufacturer’s reserve, may 
be used for direct advertising or sales 
promotion by the distributor, the major 
portion of the amounts are passed on to 
the retailers in cooperative advertising 
plans.
Probably most of us have had our ap­
pliance distributor clients argue that when 
remittance is made to the manufacturer 
for the advertising reserve, it is an ex­
pense at that time. However, neither good 
accounting nor good tax accounting will 
countenance such treatment. The distribu­
tor’s advertising expense is not necessarily 
related to his purchases. For example, 
during the shortage of appliances most 
of the distributors carried large advertis­
ing funds with the manufacturers. Now 
these funds are pretty well exhausted.
Nor is the expense based on sales. Few 
distributors allocate a reserve to each 
customer based on the sales to that cus­
tomer. However, in the face of the excess 
profits tax 18¢ dollar, some distributors 
have found their claims from customers 
for advertising funds increasing to the 
point where some limitation may have to 
be applied.
During the year, most distributors follow 
the practice of setting upon their books 
“credits due from vendors” at the time 
the claims are filed with the manufacturer. 
At the same time the retailer is credited 
with the claim he has made against the 
distributor. When the claim is honored 
by the manufacturer, the credits due from 
vendors will clear out and the distributor’s 
share of the expense will be transferred 
from advertising reserve to advertising ex­
pense. If at the end of an accounting 
period the manufacturer has been dilatory 
in honoring the claims, and if there is 
evidence that the claims will be honored, 
there should be included in the income 
statement the expense of the distributor 
as shown by claims filed.
The retailer’s problem is simple. If he 
is a small dealer, he probably charges 
his advertising costs directly to expense 
and takes credit for the allowance from 
the distributor when it is received. A year- 
end audit should take as a credit against 
advertising any valid claims filed with the 
distributor.
What pitfalls are to be avoided in transactions involving a sale and lease-back and 
gift with lease-back?
During recent years there have been many transactions involving the sale of plant 
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properties of large insurance companies accompanied by a lease-back to the seller for 
a term of years. Under some of these transactions the deductibility of the rent has 
been questioned. Also, where the transaction has resulted in a loss to the seller, 
question arises regarding the deductibility of such loss.
Similarly, numerous transactions have involved a gift of business properly to 
related persons accompanied or followed by a lease-back to the transferor.
RUSSELL S. BOCK
This is too big a question to answer 
adequately in a few words, but I shall 
try to cover a few salient points. In the 
first place, I’ll divide it into two parts, 
because an ordinary sale and lease-back 
is not the same as a gift with lease-back.
The ordinary sale and lease-back in­
volves the sale of plant properties to in­
surance companies, charitable organiza­
tions, or others, accompanied by a lease- 
back to the seller for a term of years. 
There are two important tax questions: 
(1) can the seller deduct a loss on the 
sale, and (2) are the rentals fully de­
ductible?
As to deduction of a loss, the Tax 
Court has passed on this question in three 
recent cases. In Standard Envelope Man­
ufacturing Co., 15 T.C. 41, and in May 
Department Stores Co., 16 T.C. No. 67. 
losses were allowed. The Commissioner 
has acquiesced in both of these cases. In 
Century Electric Co., 15 T.C. 581, a loss 
was disallowed, on the ground that the 
sale was in substance a tax-free exchange 
of a fee interest in real estate for a lease­
hold interest running over 30 years. The 
regulations have long provided that a 
leasehold for 30 years or more is property 
of “like kind” to a fee interest. In both 
cases where losses were allowed the lease 
was for less than thirty years.
The question of the deductibility of the 
rentals in the type of sale and lease-back 
deal which has been common in recent 
years apparently has not yet been litigated. 
However, we have some guidance in cases 
such as Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25, and 
Chicago Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441, where 
rentals and royalties were disallowed on 
the theory that the lessee was acquiring 
an equity in the property. In those cases 
the Court laid down the rule that the 
lessee is acquiring an equity if the rental 
payments exceed the depreciation in value 
of the property. I don’t think this appar­
ently simple rule can be applied in every 
case, but it is an indication of the Tax 
Court’s attitude.
Where the lease provides for a very 
high rental in the later years, it is con­
ceivable that a portion of the rent might 
be disallowed in the early years and allo­
cated to the later years of the lease. We 
have no cases on this point to date, but I 
think this possibility should not be Over­
looked.
A study of authorities suggests the fol­
lowing rules which should be followed, if 
possible, to obtain favorable tax treatment 
of sale and lease-back transactions:
1. The sale price should be fair and 
reasonable.
2. The lease should be for a period of 
less than 30 years.
3. There should preferably be no re­
newal option in the lease.
4. There should preferably be no repur­
chase option in the lease.
5. If the lease includes options to re­
new or to repurchase, the options 
should be for reasonable amounts, 
based upon the best possible estimate 
of values at the time the option may 
be exercised.
6. The staggering of rates within the 
lease period should be kept within 
reasonable limits; in other words, an 
attempt should be made to avoid an 
unreasonably high rental for the first 
few years with a reduction to an un­
reasonably low rental for later years.
7. The lessee should be prepared to es­
tablish the amount of interest and 
depreciation that should be allowed, 
if it is held that the transaction is 
essentially a loan or a purchase ar­
rangement and the rents are dis­
allowed.
The gift and lease-back presents quite 
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different problems. These situations in­
volve some of the same questions as the 
family partnership and family trust cases. 
The authorities are conflicting, with the 
cases being decided largely on the basis 
of their own special facts. The decisions 
seem to look with disfavor on transactions 
where the property is given to the wife or 
children who are not independent in their 
business affairs. They also frown upon 
arrangements where the rentals are pure­
ly arbitrary and are fixed by the donor of 
the property in excess of a fair rate.
It appears that a gift and lease-back 
arrangement has little chance of success 
unless the property is given away outright 
with no strings attached and unless the 
parties bargain for the lease on an arm’s 
length basis. This is often difficult to ac­
complish in the type of family situation 
which is usually involved in a gift and 
lease-back transaction. It is possible that 
the new family partnership rules will have 
some effect on these transactions.
Is taxpayer entitled to the benefit of capital-gain rates on sale of fully depre­
ciated assets?
Revenue agents are taking the position that if the cost of an asset has been fully 
recovered through depreciation deductions, the proceeds from the sale thereof are 
taxable at ordinary rates instead of capital gain rates. Their theory is that if 100 
per cent depreciation has been taken, it must be presumed that the asset has been 
retired from use, whether or not it is in actual use, and that, accordingly, such asset 
no longer qualifies as a depreciable asset used in the business and thus does not 
qualify as a capital asset under Section 117(j), I.R.C.
If the position of the revenue agents is correct, it is evident that it is highly impor­
tant for accountants to give careful attention to depreciation deductions in order to 
avoid complete depreciation of assets in actual use.
W. WALLER GROGAN
It appears that revenue agents are tak­
ing the position that where the cost of 
an asset has been fully recovered through 
depreciation, the proceeds from the sale 
(whether or not held more than six 
months) are to be treated as ordinary in­
come rather than capital-gain income. 
Their theory appears to be that if 100 
percent of depreciation has been claimed, 
it must be conclusively presumed that the 
asset was retired from use, whether or not 
it is in actual use, and therefore the as­
set does not qualify as one “depreciable” 
used in the trade or business and does not 
qualify under Section 117(j) I.R.C.
I do not think revenue agents are gen­
erally taking this position, nor do I be­
lieve they will prevail in that position. 
The “key” word in this situation is “char­
acter”. The statute, Section 117(j)(l) — 
definition of property used in the trade 
or business—states that “(it) means prop­
erty used in the trade or business, of a 
character which is subject to the allow­
ance for depreciation provided in Section 
23(L).” Though property may be fully de­
preciated, if it is still in use or can be 
used by the taxpayer—that is, held for 
future use, and has not been abandoned, 
the asset has not lost its character as 
“depreciable”. It seems clearly wrong to 
presume that because no further depre­
ciation may be taken or allowed the 
asset has been retired from use. It seems 
equally true that the property would de­
teriorate and therefore is of a “character 
which is subject to the allowance for 
depreciation”.
Two situations will ordinarily be found 
with respect to fully depreciated assets; 
(1) it will still be in use, or (2) it may 
be retired from use but held by the 
taxpayer for possible further use either 
in an emergency or for salvage as spare 
parts or components of the asset. In the 
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latter situation, the leading case is Wil­
son Line, Inc. 8 T.C. 394, 1947, acquiesced, 
1947—1, CB 4. There, the taxpayer dis­
mantled parts of a marine railway and 
carried this on its books as an asset at 
the estimated salvage value of $2,500 and 
thereafter claimed no depreciation. It was 
held in storage for future use and was 
therefore property used in the taxpayer’s 
business and (from the opinion) “was 
of a character subject to the allowance 
for depreciation and was not includable 
in inventory or held for sale to customers 
in the ordinary course of petitioner’s busi­
ness.” In the alternative, the petitioner 
argued that the asset, in its dismantled 
state, was a capital asset held for more 
than six months, since it was not stock in 
trade nor property held for sale to cus­
tomers in the ordinary course of business, 
and therefore, in any event, was a capital 
asset, under Section 117(a)—if not under 
Section 117 (j).
That the asset was not actually in use 
is not conclusive. It is only necessary to 
show that the asset “could have been used 
by the petitioner.” Under such circum­
stances it is therefore not conclusive that 
because the property has been fully de­
preciated, it no longer qualifies as “de­
preciable” property.
The decision in Wilson Line, Inc., supra, 
was followed by the Tax Court in Alamo 
Broadcasting Company, 15 T.C. 541, 1950, 
wherein the opinion stated, “we have pre­
viously held that ‘used in a trade or 
business’ means ‘devoted to the trade or 
business’ and includes property purchased 
with a view to its future use in the busi­
ness even though this purpose is later 
thwarted by circumstances beyond the 
taxpayer’s control.”
Explain correct inventory procedure by automobile dealers for their used cars.
Increased attention by revenue agents is being given to inventory valuation of used 
cars in the hands of automobile dealers. This question apparently involves basic 
inventory principles but increased attention being given to the problem as it arises 
in the audit by revenue agents of the returns of automobile dealers seems to warrant 
some special attention at this time.
Undoubtedly many automobile dealers have understated their used car inventories 
to their own detriment by causing the resulting income to be realized in later years 
at higher tax rates.
WILLIAM H. WESTPHAL
Second-hand cars acquired by auto­
mobile dealers as trade-ins should be 
valued at bona fide selling prices less di­
rect cost of disposition regardless of 
whether inventories are valued at cost or 
at the lower of cost or market. This rule 
is set forth in Regulations III, Sec. 29.22 
(c) (2), which provides that second-hand 
goods should be valued on this basis.
As a practical matter, inventories of 
used cars are usually priced in accordance 
with the values shown in a list published 
by the National Automobile Dealers As­
sociation. This is then reduced by an off­
setting reserve for reconditioning used and 
repossessed cars. The net effect of such 
treatment at the end of the accounting 
period is to take the used cars into account 
in the closing inventory at their market 
value less the cost of disposition.
In the Lord Motor Company case, 
5 B.T.A. 818, this estimated cost of dis­
position was considered to be 25 per cent 
of the sales price and in the average case 
its range is between twenty and twenty- 
five per cent.
Before effecting a change in method of 
computing inventories, it should be demon­
strated satisfactorily that the inventories 
are incorrect as to basic principle, and it is 
well to bear in mind this cardinal rule— 
that consistency in method is of great im­
portance, but the perpetuation of gross 
error on the grounds of consistency should 
not be permitted.
But let us suppose that the method of 
inventory computation is shown to be gross­
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ly in error. What method of correction 
may be followed? In cases involving in­
ventory changes, we have situations in 
which (1) the correction of the opening 
inventory would reduce the tax, and (2) 
the correction of the opening inventory 
would increase the tax.
In the case of the former, we are likely 
to find that if the preceding year is barred 
by the statute of limitations, it will be 
very difficult to effect the adjustment of the 
opening inventory. There is a line of cases 
involving the application of the doctrine 
of estoppel that can cause a taxpayer 
undertaking such a correction the greatest 
difficulty. The Commissioner can show that 
the error is one of fact, that the taxpayer 
was in possession of the true facts at the 
time of the preparation of the return, and 
that the Commissioner relied upon this rep­
resentation to his detriment. Therefore, it 
will be very difficult to persuade him that 
he should now allow the adjustment. Inter­
esting cases in point are those of Eureka 
Fire Brick Works, 5 T.C.M. 998, and 
Swift Manufacturing Company v. United 
States 12 F. Supp. 453.
On the other hand, the Commissioner is 
on sound grounds in insisting on an open­
ing inventory adjustment where it works 
to his advantage to do so, and is supported 
by cases in point if he wishes to make this 
change. His position under such condition 
was supported by the Court in Commis­
sioner v. Gooch Milling and Elevator Com­
pany, 64 S. Ct. (1948).
What, then, can the taxpayer do to heal 
a troublesome situation of this type and 
establish his inventories once and for all 
time on a sound income tax basis without 
subjecting himself to terrific tax penalties? 
It is suggested that, if a year is yet open 
in which the tax rates are fairly low, the 
correction be made in that year, adjusting 
the closing inventory but not the opening 
inventory. It is quite probable that the 
government will permit the correction to 
stand. If, for example, a tax return is 
prepared for an automobile company that 
sets forth grossly erroneous valuations of 
used cars, and the current year looms be­
fore the taxpayer as an excess-profits-tax 
year, the oldest open years in the pre­
excess-profit-tax days may be considered 
as a possible place in which to make the 
correcting adjustment, if it serves to in­
crease the inventories. If the taxpayer is in 
a 38 per cent bracket for the year 1948, 
which is yet open, it appears that the cor­
rection can be made in that year, leaving 
the opening inventory unadjusted, but 
changing the closing inventory.
Suppose, however, that the correction is 
made by the Commissioner? In all prob­
ability, he will not reduce the opening in­
ventory to correspond with the closing 
inventory if the previous year is barred by 
the statute of limitations. What recourse, 
then, will the taxpayer have to prevent the 
imposition of an unjust pyramiding of tax?
Section 3801 has been suggested as a 
possible remedy, but there is considerable 
doubt that an inconsistent position within 
the purview of that section is involved, al­
though it has been applied administrative­
ly, in principle, to prevent gross inequity. 
It is possible, however, that an equity ad­
justment may be worked out administra­
tively so that the taxpayer will pay the tax 
that should have been paid had the in­
ventory been correctly computed for all 
years. Also, in the case of a corporation 
in excess-profits tax, the provisions of Sec­
tion 456 pertaining to abnormal income 
should be thoroughly explored in the year 
of the changeover. It appears that it may 
be reasoned soundly that such an adjust­
ment would represent abnormal income of 
a type applicable to preceding years, and 
not properly subject to excess-profits tax. 
Bringing the family partnership situation up to date. What are the recent Court 
interpretations of what should constitute a family partnership? What can be done to 
solve the problems which exist?
WALTER M. BURY
A large number of decisions on the uncertainties as to what types of plans will 
family partnership tax problem still leaves be recognized as effective and what types
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are to be avoided. Explanation of two or 
three of the outstanding highlights might 
serve a useful purpose.
The Senate Finance Committee has 
brought the family partnership situation 
up to date by stating in its report on the 
Revenue Bill of 1951, that the determina­
tion of the status of a family partnership 
under existing law has been extremely un­
certain and that a state of confusion still 
exists with respect to the possible settle­
ment of many cases pending with the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Our intention 
is to review briefly the high spots of the 
current situation.
Since the Revenue Act of 1948 allowed 
splitting of the income of a husband and 
wife for income-tax purposes, the family 
partnership question does not have much 
significance as to husband and wife part­
nerships for years subsequent to 1947. 
However, it does have significance for 
family partnerships consisting of members 
other than a husband and wife and also as 
to husband and wife partnerships for years 
prior to 1948.
Following the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the Tower and Lus­
thaus cases (Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Francis E. Tower 327 U.S. 280 
and A. L. Lusthaus v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 327 U.S. 293) which 
were handed down in 1946, the Tax Court’s 
approach to the partnership problem was 
that it considered as essential to member­
ship in a family partnership for tax 
purposes the contribution of capital 
originating with the member or substantial 
participation in the control and manage­
ment of the business or the performance 
of vital services. It was not material that 
the partnership was not formed for tax 
avoidance purposes. The circuit court deci­
sions apparently were more concerned with 
whether the facts indicated that a real 
bona fide partnership had been formed.
On June 27, 1949, the United States 
Supreme Court gave further consideration 
to the family partnership problem in its 
decision in Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Culbertson, et al, 337 U.S. 733. 
The Supreme Court stated that its deci­
sion in the Tower case was misinterpreted 
by the Tax Court and that the question of 
whether a partnership exists for income- 
tax purposes is not whether services or 
capital are contributed by a partner, “but 
whether, considering all the facts . . . the 
parties in good faith and acting with a 
business purpose intended to join together 
in the present conduct of the enterprise.” 
Thus the Supreme Court shifted the em­
phasis in testing a family partnership from 
the contribution of capital and vital ser­
vices test to the reality test. The question 
which now must be answered is: Does a 
partnership exist in substance as well as 
in form?
There has been no indication, however, 
of substantial liberalization on the part of 
the lower courts as a result of the Culbert­
son case. Although original capital and vi­
tal services may not be considered as a 
decisive test, nevertheless, they serve as 
the best proof of an intention to form a 
valid partnership. Tax Court decisions 
since the Culbertson case indicate that the 
formation of a partnership in order to save 
income taxes through an intrafamily gift 
of a partnership interest where the donee 
performs no substantial services will not 
result in a valid partnership for tax pur­
poses. Just as in tax-free reorganizations 
“business purpose” seems important. Some 
of the Circuit Courts of Appeals appear 
more liberal than the Tax Court. Thus, the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
recognition of minor children as partners 
though they acquired their interests with 
promissory notes and contributed no valu­
able services. (Arnold v. Harry B. Green, 
186 F.2d 18). The Tenth Circuit af­
firmed a district court decision recogniz­
ing a husband and wife partnership where­
in a husband who was about to be sent 
overseas by the armed forces gave his 
wife half interest in several partnerships 
in order to provide for her financial inde­
pendence in case of his death (Schaaf 
Baker v. Jones, D. C. Oklahoma 7-6-50, 
affirmed CCA-10, 5-21-51).
The Tax Court, however, is not averse 
to recognizing bona fide partnerships as 
valid. The court recognized a son in the 
armed services as a partner with his father 
in a lumber business where the son was 
made a partner and rendered valuable 
services before he enlisted in the army, but 
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it did not recognize as a partner the second 
son who was made a partner after he had 
joined the Navy (Joe Denton Harris, Jr. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10 
TCM 477). In Theodore D. Stern (15 T.C. 
521) the Tax Court recognized trusts for 
taxpayer’s wife and children as valid 
limited partners in a partnership organized 
under Illinois law.
The unfortunate aspect of the family 
partnership problem is that it has not been 
possible for owners of sole proprietorships 
to give away property interests in such a 
business to other members of the family 
and thus to have the income attributable 
to such property taxable to the donee 
owner. Why this can be done easily with 
respect to other assets, such as real prop­
erty and stock and bonds even if the trans­
fer is made solely to save taxes but not 
with respect to an interest in a business, is 
not understandable. The Senate Finance 
Committee is fully aware of this particular 
discrimination as is evident from its com­
ments on Section 339 of the Revenue Bill 
of 1951 in its committee report on the bill. 
It appears that if the proposed section is 
enacted into law a fair rule should be 
established for the recognition of family 
partnerships. To quote from the committee 
report “. . . the bill provides that in 
the case of any partnership interest 
created by gift, the allocation of in­
come, according to the terms of the 
partnership agreement, shall be con­
trolling for income-tax purposes ex­
cept when the shares are allocated without 
proper allowance of reasonable compensa­
tion for services rendered to the partner­
ship by the donor, and except to the ex­
tent that the allocation to the donated 
capital is proportionately greater than that 
attributable to the donor’s capital. In such 
cases a reasonable allowance will be made 
for the services rendered by the partners, 
and the balance of the income will be al­
located according to the amount of capital 
which the several partners have invested. 
However, the distributive share of a part­
ner in the earnings of the partnership will 
not be diminished because of absence.
This amendment at the election of any 
member of a family partnership is to be 
effective with respect to any open taxable 
year since December 31, 1938, but will be 
valid only if any other members of the 
partnership whose taxable income would 
be increased or decreased consent to the 
resulting adjustment of their tax liability.
Certainly, the enactment of this section 
into law will not solve all the family part­
nership problems. Partnerships to be re­
cognized will have to be genuine and bona 
fide and the gifts complete. However, it 
should be a long step forward in placing 
the family partnership on the same basis 
with other property, recognizing that in­
come from property which is the subject of 
a completed gift is properly attributable to 
the donee and that income from personal 
services is properly attributable to the per­
son rendering the services and is not as­
signable for tax purposes to someone else.
(Section 339 of the Revenue Bill of 1951 
as reported by the Senate Finance Com­
mittee was enacted into law as section 340 
of the Revenue Act of 1951 with the im­
portant change that the amendments made 
by this section were made applicable with 
respect to taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 1950. The retroactive appli­
cation of the amendment to years begin­
ning after December 31, 1938, was thus 
eliminated.)
What procedure is applicable for accounting for income from royalties under a 
patent acquired by inheritance?
CHARLES N. WHITEHEAD
Assuming a patent to have been valued 
at $100,000 for the purpose of the federal 
estate tax and to have a remaining life 
of ten years, questions arise as to whether 
such valuation is to be recovered for in­
come-tax purposes by applying proceeds 
against the basis until the basis is re­
covered, by depreciation deductions, or 
only to the extent resulting from applica­
tion of section 126(c), I.R.C.
Revenue Agents have urged that the 
applicable procedure is to allow deductions 
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only to the extent permitted under Code 
section 126(c). In support of such position 
they cite the decision in the case of Estate 
of Thomas Remington v. Commissioner, 
9 T.C. 99, applicable to insurance commis­
sions for personal services.
In the recent case of Estate of John W. 
F. Hobbs v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 153, 
(CCH Dec. 18,336) the Tax Court held 
that the value of a leasehold as determined 
for estate-tax purposes should be recov­
ered for income-tax purposes by means of 
amortization over the remaining term of 
the lease. The Hobbs case involved a prop­
erty value and not any factor of personal 
earnings.
In a case involving personal earnings 
for years 1941, 1942, and 1943, the Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals (Second) held that 
the value of an employment contract 
which had been subjected to estate tax 
should be amortized over the remaining 
life of the contract. May D. Hatch v. Com­
missioner, June 29, 1951, reversing and re­
manding 14 T.C. 237.
Inherited rights under patents, includ­
ing patents which have become the subject 
of exclusive licenses of a type classifiable 
as a sale, constitute property rights rather 
than contracts for services. Regardless of 
the procedure applicable to personal ser­
vice contracts, it appears that the basis of 
such a patent or exclusive license should 
be recoverable for income-tax purposes 
either by amortization deductions or by 
applying the proceeds against the basis 
until the basis has been recovered, as in 
the case of Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 
involving payments under a mineral lease.
Is section 126(c) involved to any extent 
in the case of royalties from inherited pat­
ent interests? And how can the decision 
in the Remington case be reconciled with 
the Hatch case?
In the case of Whitehurst v. Commis­
sioner, 12 BTA 1416, (1928) the Board al­
lowed depreciation on inherited patents to 
be based on the estate-tax value. The 
Commissioner announced nonacquiescence, 
which apparently is still a hurdle for rev­
enue agents although the technical staff 
has recognized the propriety of deprecia­
tion based on the estate value.
The question really covers two classes of 
patents and patent rights: (1) Patents 
owned by decedent at the date of death 
which had not been sold prior to death 
and (2) patent rights in which the dece­
dent had executed a sale or an exclusive 
license tantamount to a sale under patent 
law. It appears that the tax consequences 
of the two situations are different.
It is my opinion that the heirs will be 
entitled to annual depreciation deductions 
over the life of the patent in which the 
cost basis (i.e., the fair-market value of 
date of death) will be recovered. Section 
113(a) (5) provides that an asset has a bas­
is to the heirs for income-tax purposes equal 
to the fair-market value at the date of 
death or the optional valuation date de­
pending upon the election made in the 
estate-tax return. The patent here con­
sidered was owned by the decedent at date 
of death and is a capital asset, hence 
section 113(a) (5) should determine the 
basis. This holding should follow regard­
less of whether the patent was owned sub­
ject to or without a license at the date of 
death. Other than the Whitehurst case, 
there appears to be no decided cases and 
that case is nonacquiesced by the Treasury 
Department. The reason for the nonac­
quiescence is difficult to determine; the 
case was an early case in which section 
126 was not considered. On the other hand, 
settlements apparently have been made in 
the Technical Staff on the theory that the 
taxpayer is entitled to a basis for the 
patent and that the basis should be re­
covered over the life of the patent.
The recent decision in the Estate of 
Remington (9 T.C. 99) apparently has 
been used by the Bureau as authority for 
disallowance of a new basis subject to 
depreciation. Instead, income from the 
patent is held by the Bureau to be section 
126 income. This treatment I believe to be 
erroneous. In the case of Hatch (14 T.C. 
237, affd. C.A. June, 1951) the decedent 
was the owner of a contract with a cor­
poration providing for annual payments of 
$30,000 after his death for a period of ten 
years. In the Hatch case the Tax Court 
and the Circuit Court determined that the 
estate was entitled to the fair-market value 
of the contract as of the date of death as 
a basis and that only the excess over such 
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value received from the contract constituted 
taxable income. In the Remington case, the 
decedent was an insurance broker who had 
arranged with his employer for a payment 
based upon income from certain accounts 
over a period of years in the event of his 
death. When the amounts were received 
after death, the estate took the position 
that the agreement was tantamount to a 
sale of a capital asset, but the Tax Court 
held that the income, that is, insurance 
commissions and renewals, was section 
126 income.
It seems that the distinction between the 
cases is that in the Remington case there 
was involved only uncertain future income 
which would be paid to the decedent’s heirs 
if collected and that there was no sale 
made to the decedent’s employers. The 
Tax Court held that the arrangement did 
not constitute a sale or exchange of a con­
tract, but was merely a sharing of profits 
which, had the decedent lived, would have 
constituted ordinary income. Accordingly, 
the Tax Court held that the income re­
ceived by the decedent’s estate in the 
Remington case constituted section 126 
income. Apparently the estate would have 
been entitled to a deduction for estate tax 
had the estate been subject to federal 
estate tax. In the Hatch case there was a 
definite contract for payment of $30,000 
per year for a period of ten years after 
the death of decedent. This was a definite 
and certain contract susceptible of valua­
tion, and the Tax Court held that, to the 
extent of its fair-market value as shown on 
the federal estate-tax return, the estate 
was entitled to recover its basis (the 
estate-tax value). No reference was made 
to section 126 in the Hatch decisions.
Thus, while the two cases may appear 
inconsistent, the difference in decisions can 
be rationalized by the essential difference 
in the nature of the payments. In the Rem­
ington case the payment was contingent 
and uncertain; in the Hatch case the pay­
ments were definite, certain in amount, and 
completely susceptible of valuation. The 
Tax Court held that the Hatch contract 
constituted a capital asset of the dece­
dent’s estate whereas the agreement in the 
Remington case was considered to be dif­
ferent. Parenthetically, the Circuit Court 
held that the gain (i.e., the difference be­
tween the total payments and the present 
value at date of death) was to be spread 
ratably over the life of the contract, and 
the first payments were not to be applied 
against the basis until the basis had been 
recovered.
The rationale of the Hatch case appears 
to be supported by the cases such as the 
Burnett case (2 T.C. 897A) involving the 
value of no-cost livestock as of the date 
of death of the decedent. In such cases 
the fair-market value of the livestock be­
comes the basis in the hands of the estate 
regardless of the fact that no income had 
been reported on the livestock prior to the 
decedent’s death and the entire expense of 
raising such cattle had been deducted as 
expense by the decedent during his life­
time. In the Hobbs case (16 T.C. 153) the 
Tax Court held that the date of death 
value of a leasehold interest held by a 
decedent lessee should be amortized over 
the remaining life of the lease.
Accordingly, as to patents in which the 
decedent had an ownership interest, even 
though subject to a nonexclusive royalty, 
it would appear that the decedent’s estate 
is entitled to a deduction for amortization 
over the remaining life of the patent equal 
to the value established in the estate-tax 
return. Based upon the Circuit Court’s 
decision in the Hatch case, it would seem 
almost certain that the recovery of such 
cost basis would be over the life of the 
patent rather than by application of royal­
ties to the tax base until the tax base had 
been recovered.
In cases where the decedent, prior to 
his death, had transferred his patent rights 
under an exclusive license to make, use, 
and sell (See Meyers v. Commissioner, 6 
T.C. 258) in a contract tantamount under 
patent law to a sale, the situation appears 
different. In such cases the decedent made 
a sale for an indefinite consideration prior 
to his death, and up to the date of death 
the sale proceeds had not been received. 
After death, however, it appears that the 
gain on the sale comes squarely within the 
provisions of section 126. Section 29.126-1 
of Regulations 111 treats as section 126 in­
come amounts received by the estate 
where the decedent had made a sale of 
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property but had not received payment 
therefor prior to death. Apparently under 
Mim. 6490, the Bureau would contend that 
the proceeds from such a patent sale con­
tract were ordinary income for years be­
ginning in 1951; therefore, for such years, 
the amounts would be taxable as ordinary 
income under section 126 providing that 
Mim. 6490 is substantiated by later court 
decisions. In any event, whether the income 
is capital gain or ordinary income 
to the estate, and to the extent that 
the value of the contract had been included 
in the estate-tax return, the estate would 
be entitled to an estate tax deduction.
In summary, it is my feeling that the 
estate is entitled to depreciation on a pat­
ent owned by the decedent at date of his 
death based upon the fair-market value 
of the patent as of the date of death spread 
over the remaining life of the patent. It is 
my opinion that there is no statutory basis 
for treating the income from such a patent 
as section 126 income. Unfortunately, there 
appears to be no decided cases covering 
the latter situation, and only one old 
nonacquiesced case on the first point. If 
the patent has been sold prior to the date 
of decedent’s death under a contract for 
an indeterminate sale price or otherwise, 
then it seems that the amounts receivable 
under that contract would constitute sec­
tion 126 income in the hands of the heirs 
reduced only by the deduction for federal 
estate tax provided by section 125(c) on 
the estate’s income-tax return.
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What exemptions can the predecessor or the successor allow in reference to 
the company earning experience in a complete take-over? What can be expected 
taxwise in a partial take-over? What types of transactions can be considered to be 
partial take-overs or split-ups?
J. S. SEIDMAN
[The material which follows is a part of the address given by J. S. Seidman. The initial part of 
his presentation is unavailable, due to circumstances beyond our control. Editor]
W
hat happens if the succession takes 
place within the base period? Well, 
for that purpose again let’s raise a few 
principles. The predecessor, when there is 
a take-over, is considered as if it went out 
of business entirely and was born anew 
the day after the take-over.
Conversely, the successor is considered 
as if it suddenly acquired whiskers and 
had the age and the vintage of the prede­
cessor company. But the point is that if 
you remember that the effect of a take­
over is as if a successor goes back to the 
life of the old company and the predeces­
sor, as of the day of the take-over is 
reborn, you will have in your possession, 
the general ideas. It is really the infusion 
of tax hormones in the reverse; the pre­
decessor acquires monkey glands and is 
born anew, and the successor acquires 
social security glands.
Now with that principle, we revert to 
the original question: what happens when 
the take-over takes place, we will say, 
in the beginning of 1948. Well, within the 
framework of those principles, these con­
clusions would logically follow and do 
follow as a matter of law, that the suc­
cessor taking over in 1948, inherits the 
predecessor’s earnings experience for 1946 
and 1947. The predecessor continuing in 
business in 1948 and 1949, has its own 
earnings experience in 1948 and 1949 to 
make use of on its own.
There are also some wrinkles that weave 
into this problem where I said an acqui­
sition is made for cash. It doesn’t come 
under the succession arrangement, but 
you can see that instead of acquiring for 
cash, what might happen is this: a suc­
cessor first acquires all of the stock of a 
predecessor and pays cash for that stock, 
and then liquidates the predecessor. That 
is a complicated subject, which time does 
not permit us to investigate further here.
Let’s go to the phase of this inheritance 
and take-over that may have some more 
appeal. In the first place, this entire 
scheme that we are talking about merely 
deals with the problem of the determina­
tion of the exemption of the predecessor 
or the successor when that exemption is 
figured by reference to the earnings ex­
perience of either company, but you know 
that there are some other ways of figuring 
the exemption. You can figure the ex­
emption by reference to the capital invest­
ment of a company. You can figure the 
exemption by reference to a $25,000 mini­
mum. You can figure the exemption or at 
least figure the tax by reference to a fixed 
maximum 62 per cent rate, without any 
worry or concern about the earnings ex­
perience or the capital investment.
Obviously, where those factors are in­
volved, then none of these provisions has 
any meaning. On the other hand, look at 
this interesting possibility: let’s suppose 
the predecessor company figures its in­
vestment by reference to capital invest­
ment. When the predecessor company 
transfers assets to the successor, the fact 
that it has to give up some of its earnings 
experience doesn’t mean anything, because 
it isn’t interested in earnings experience; 
it is figuring its exemption by reference 
to capital investment. On the other hand, 
a successor inherits an earnings credit, 
an earnings experience over and above its 
own experience; it inherits from the 
predecessor a right to add to its own 
revenues or earnings, the earnings ex­
perience of that predecessor without the 
predecessor losing that experience, or 
without that loss having any significance.
So you have got an interesting play 
there of being able to organize subsid­
iaries and being able to make transfers 
from one company to another to the tax 
profit of both. I point out that while this 
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mechanism deals with the inheritance of 
earnings of the successor company from 
the predecessor, there isn’t a correspond­
ing inheritance of any net loss or any­
thing. There isn’t any corresponding in­
heritance of the unused credit carryback 
or carryforward. Quite to the contrary, as 
you all know, some serious problems can 
arise about net losses and carryforwards 
and carrybacks of unused credit when­
ever there is a shift from one company 
to another.
On the other hand, in spite of that, 
there are some more interesting possi­
bilities. Suppose you have a situation 
where you have a subsidiary that has 
higher earnings with a low exemption. 
You have a parent that has high exemp­
tion but low earnings. All you have to do 
is shift one into the other, match the two, 
have the parent company inherit the earn­
ings of a subsidiary and make use of its 
own exemption. The net result should be 
a tax saving. As a matter of fact, you can 
go much further. You can have the type 
of situation that lends itself to interesting 
tax possibilities. Suppose the subsidiary 
is a Western Hemisphere company. It had 
large earnings during 1946-49, but the 
Western Hemisphere company pays no 
excess-profits tax. The parent company 
liquidates the Western Hemisphere com­
pany into itself and inherits the earnings 
though those earnings would never have 
been the basis of an excess-profits tax 
exemption. It adds those earnings to itself, 
increases its own exemption, and then per­
haps starts doing business through some 
other company or in some other area 
through a new company; a brand new 
Western Hemisphere company, and again 
there is considerable advantage in the tax 
picture.
My own feeling is that this provision is 
pregnant with many interesting tax pos­
sibilities.
Well, so much for the complete take­
over. Now, let’s consider the partial take­
over, where there is an inheritance of 
only part of a company. In the common 
vernacular, that is referred to as split- 
ups. More technically, what is involved 
is that when one company transfers only 
part of its assets to the successor com­
pany and the transfer is made on the 
circumstances that involve either a tax-free 
reorganization, or where the transferring 
company takes back an 80 per cent con­
trol in the successor company, or it may 
be a partnership that makes the transfer, 
the typical outlet for it is perhaps the 
organization of a subsidiary by a parent 
company, with the parent company just 
transferring part of its assets.
You also may have the type of situation 
where one company transfers its assets to 
two successors, or you can have a part­
nership transferring to one or more cor­
porations. In any event, inherent in what 
is involved for our purpose and the key­
note is that there has been a transfer to 
a successor of only part of the assets of 
the predecessor.
Now, let’s see what the effect of that is. 
I indicated at the outset that with earn­
ings following assets, the logic of the situ­
ation was that when part of the assets are 
transferred, part of the earnings are in­
herited by the successor. How do you 
measure that part? Well, the primary 
mechanism is that the earnings being re­
lated to the assets, the size of the inheri­
tance by the successor is measured on 
the basis of the relationship of the value 
of the assets that it had inherited, com­
pared with the total assets of the prede­
cessor.
Now, we know from grim experience 
that that raises value problems not only 
of the assets that we see, but also the 
intangibles. There must be an evaluation 
given to good will if there be good will, 
whether that good will be transferred to 
the successor, or retained by the prede­
cessor. In recognition of that difficulty, 
and also in recognition of the fact that it 
doesn’t always follow that earnings may 
be related to the value of the assets at 
any particular time, there is an alternate 
mechanism permitted in the law, and that 
is that the size of the inheritance by the 
successor company can be measured in re­
lation to the identified earnings of the 
particular assets to which it has succeeded.
That is all very beautiful if it weren’t 
for the fact that there was just one slight 
“if” injected in the provision. You can do 
all that to your heart’s content; you can 
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have an agreement between the prede­
cessor and the successor as to how much 
earnings have been inherited by the suc­
cessor; as I say, that is all very easy as 
long as you get the Secretary of the 
Treasury to participate and join in and 
consent to that agreement.
Well, here again, as in the case of com­
plete succession, I want to point out that 
although there is a split-up of earnings 
between predecessor and successor, there 
is no split-up of net loss, there is no split- 
up of an unused credit. As a matter of 
fact, one of the interesting things, one 
of the things that sort of baffles me a bit 
is that when a partnership transfers some 
of its assets to a corporation, there is a 
split-up for this purpose and there is an 
inheritance of part of the earnings expe­
rience of the partnership. On the other 
hand, when a proprietorship makes a 
transfer, there is no inheritance. A pro­
prietorship for this purpose cannot be a 
decedent, cannot be a testator, cannot be­
queath anything.
Obviously, the way out, if you are seek­
ing a way out of an intent upon having 
a succession of earnings, is to have the 
proprietorship first devolve into some part­
nership and then have the partnership 
make the transfer. But as we stand now, 
there is the discrimination between part­
nership and proprietorship, and I am not 
clear that I understand why.
Now, let’s have some interesting ques­
tions on the problem, and these, I think, 
may have some appeal.
Question No. 1: If a transfer is made by 
a parent company to its subsidiary of 
assets, but the transfer is made into the 
paid-in surplus of the subsidiary as dis­
tinguished from the receipt of stock, does 
that constitute a split-up?
If you read the law as it is written, the 
answer is no, it isn’t a split-up, because 
the law distinctly says that the transfer 
must be for stock or securities. As a mat­
ter of fact, it is very clear in the law that 
they knew about paid-in surplus because 
there is some technical provision that does 
refer to paid-in surplus, but not in this 
respect.
So that I take it that anyone who wants 
to get around the split-up provisions, if 
the split-up would have an adverse effect 
taxwise, could get around it by making 
the transfer to the paid-in surplus of the 
subsidiary instead of the capital stock. 
We as accountants know that for prac­
tical purposes there isn’t any particular 
difference between capital stock and paid- 
in surplus. I don’t know whether it was 
intended by the law to create that differ­
ence. I merely submit to you that reading 
the law it reads, there is that difference.
Now, of course, if you are looking for 
a way out on a transfer, or to avoid a 
split-up, you can, in any event, do it by 
transferring assets to the subsidiary for a 
loan or open account of a subsidiary 
rather than stock or paid-in surplus, and 
that avoids a split-up.
Question No. 2: (This to me is a far 
more significant and important one.) 
When a parent company transfers only 
cash to a subsidiary in exchange for 
stock, is that a split-up? I am envisioning 
the situation where you even have a new 
subsidiary that is getting started, or an 
old subsidiary that is existing and the 
parent company financing it by transfer­
ring cash in exchange for stock. I must 
confess that I have rather dogmatically 
answered to clients and others when I 
was asked that question, “Of course it is 
a split-up.” To begin with, under World 
War II the regulation specifically charac­
terized it as such, under the provisions 
of split-up in World War II.
Secondly, the Bureau has several times 
held that cash is property for the purpose 
of measuring whether there is a contin­
uing 80 per cent control. On the other 
hand, I must also acknowledge that the 
new regulations say nothing on this sub­
ject, and very interesting is the fact that 
I have with me a ruling from the Bureau 
that holds that a transfer for cash is not 
a split-up. Now if a transfer of cash for 
stock is not a split-up, then here are some 
of the interesting possibilities: a company 
organizes a subsidiary. The subsidiary, 
since there is no technical split-up in­
volved, gets its own $25,000 exemption, 
if Section 123 has been kicked out of the 
bill. In any event, we will have the status 
of a new company with all of the favorable 
provisions that apply under the existing law 
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as to new companies and that are likely 
to apply if some of the Senate provisions 
of the bill pass and the parent company 
will still retain its own earnings expe­
rience and be able to continue to use them, 
which I rather imagine may be an inter­
esting way of playing fast and loose with 
taxes, but I suppose we have given up a 
long time ago looking for a perfect tax 
law. We had probably better reconcile 
ourselves to the fact that we are going 
to have taxes until death. As a matter of 
fact, I have always been amused by the 
fact that death and taxes have been placed 
together as being conjointly in area. I 
have always found a very distinct differ­
ence between death and taxes, because at 
least in the case of death, it doesn’t get 
worse every time Congress meets.
Maybe you can get some consolation out 
of the fact that Adam Smith, one of our 
famous classical economists, once said 
that taxation is a badge of democracy. 
Well, if taxation is the badge of democ­
racy, I can give you these reassurances: 
this country of ours is safe for democracy 
for a long time, and we are going to have 
a mighty big badge to show it.
An explanation of the purpose of Part III of the Excess Profits Tax Act and its effects. 
Section 471—what transfers does it cover? What does the term “incorporate liquida­
tion” mean as used in Section 470 and 472? In what cases do the provisions of 
these sections apply?
T. T. SHAW
I would like to comment on section 471 
before section 470, as sections 470 and 472 
both pertain to intercorporate liquidations 
and should therefore be considered to­
gether.
This section relates to transfers of 
property by one corporation to another as 
paid-in capital under the historical in­
vested capital approach in transactions 
where a substituted basis applies. The 
corresponding provision under the asset 
approach is section 441 (g).
The purpose of section 471 is to limit 
the amount includable in invested capital 
by the transferee corporation to the excess 
of the amount of the transferor’s basis for 
the property over any debt obligations 
issued or assumed by the transferee or to 
which the property was subject, or over 
any money or the fair value of any other 
property given by the transferee as part 
consideration for the transfer.
The effect of this rule is to allocate the 
basis of property received in an exchange 
first to any consideration given by the 
transferee other than its own stock, with 
only the remaining portion of the basis 
included as paid-in equity invested capital.
For example, if property with an ad­
justed basis of $1,000,000 and subject to a 
mortgage of say $800,000 were transferred 
by one corporation to another as paid-in 
capital in a transaction where a substituted 
basis applied, the amount includable in 
the transferee’s invested capital would be 
limited by section 471 to $200,000.
Section 471 covers only transfers by 
corporations and only transfers where a 
substituted basis applies. The section 
seems to be deficient in this respect. For 
instance, nowhere does it say what you 
should do where the transfer is by an 
individual or a partnership in a section 
112(b) (5) transaction, and nowhere does 
it say what the rule is where a substituted 
basis does not apply and property is paid 
in subject to the transferee corporation 
issuing or assuming a debt obligation as 
part consideration for the transfer of the 
property.
If no special provision is needed to 
cover transfers by individuals and partner­
ships, and no special provision is needed 
where a substituted basis does not apply, 
it raises a question as to why a provision 
such as section 471 is necessary where 
the transferor is a corporation or where 
a substituted basis does apply.
Where property was acquired by one 
corporation from another as paid-in capi­
tal in a transaction which under the law 
when it occurred did not qualify as an ex­
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change with a carry-over of basis, but 
subsequently, by reason of a change in the 
law did so qualify, the law as of the time 
of acquisition is disregarded and the ex­
change is considered as qualifying for 
the carry-over method of determining basis 
if the property is still held in the excess- 
profits-tax year or, in the case of property 
disposed of, if the law had been changed 
when the disposition took place.
For income-tax purposes the law pre­
scribes in all cases of a substituted basis 
the usual adjustments for depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion in respect of 
the period during which the property was 
held by the transferor. In most cases a 
further adjustment must be made by in­
creasing the transferor’s basis, as adjusted 
for depreciation, etc., by the amount of 
any gain recognized to the transferor upon 
the exchange. An example of this kind is 
the acquisition of property by a corpora­
tion in connection with a reorganization.
Both of these adjustments may be differ­
ent for purposes of section 471 from what 
they are for ordinary income-tax purposes. 
With respect to the period prior to the re­
ceipt of the property by the transferee, the 
adjustments are those prescribed for the 
computation of earnings and profits. For 
example, discovery or percentage depletion 
are not taken into account in computing 
earnings and profits, and consequently 
they are not the kind of depletion to be 
used in adjusting the transferor’s basis to 
convert it into the transferee’s unadjusted 
basis for invested capital purposes. Like­
wise, the amount of any gain or loss recog­
nized to the transferor upon the exchange 
in question affects the basis to the trans­
feree for invested capital purposes only to 
the extent to which it is taken into account 
in computing the earnings and profits of 
the transferor.
The liabilities assumed, or the additional 
consideration given by the transferee, may 
in some cases exceed the basis of the 
property it receives. For example, assume 
that property with a basis of $600,000 has 
a current value of $1,000,000, and is 
subject to a mortgage of $700,000. In this 
case the liability to which the property 
is subject exceeds the basis of the prop­
erty. In a situation of this kind section 
471 would require the daily invested capi­
tal of the transferee of the property to be 
reduced by $100,000 as a result of the 
transfer; that is, by the excess of the 
mortgage over the basis. The regulations 
state that the daily invested capital may 
be a minus amount after a transaction 
such as this. If the transferor were an in­
dividual or a partnership, section 471 
would not of course apply. In that event 
the transferee would seem justified in not 
reducing daily invested capital in a situa­
tion of this kind.
Section 471 is limited to transactions 
wherein property is paid in for stock or 
as paid-in capital, and consequently does 
not apply to exchanges which constitute 
intercorporate liquidations. These are cov­
ered by sections 470 and 472.
Section 470
The term “intercorporate liquidation” as 
used in sections 470 and 472 means the 
receipt of property by one corporation in 
complete liquidation of another under a 
provision of law by which no gain or loss 
is recognized to the recipient corporation. 
Liquidations under section 112(b) (6) are 
the most common form of intercorpor­
ate liquidation. Also included are liquida­
tions during consolidated return periods 
since 1929. For years prior to 1929 liqui­
dations during consolidated return periods 
were considered taxable and so would not 
qualify as intercorporate liquidations un­
less they were erroneously treated as non- 
taxable when the liquidation occurred. In 
that event even a pre-1929 liquidation dur­
ing a consolidated return period would 
be treated as an intercorporate liquida­
tion for excess-profits-tax purposes unless 
the taxpayer decided to take an inconsist­
ent position and pay any tax that might be 
due on the old liquidation.
A liquidation in connection with a re­
organization other than a statutory merger 
or consolidation should not be treated as 
an intercorporate liquidation. This is be­
cause such a liquidation is merely a step 
in the reorganization and not really a 
liquidation in the regular sense. (San 
Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co. 28 B.T.A. 
395.)
The provisions of section 470 apply 
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only where the stock of the liquidated 
subsidiary had a cost basis in the hands 
of the parent company. However, before 
concluding that stock of a liquidated 
subsidiary did not have a cost basis, it is 
necessary to study carefully the rules re­
garding determination of basis, which are 
set out in detail in the regulations per­
taining to section 472, but which apply 
also to section 470. It would be well to 
note that stock may have a non-cost basis 
for ordinary income-tax purposes and have 
a cost basis under the intercorporate li­
quidation provisions.
The general purpose of the intercorpor­
ate liquidation provisions in so far as they 
relate to cost basis stock, is to adjust the 
invested capital of the transferee (parent) 
for the difference between the basis of the 
stock and the underlying assets attribut­
able to the stock at the date 80% or more 
control of the subsidiary was acquired. The 
theory of this adjustment is that the in­
vested capital of the parent company after 
the liquidation should be the same as it 
would have been if the parent company 
had acquired the subsidiary’s assets di­
rectly rather than by the indirect route 
of first acquiring the stock and then ac­
quiring the assets in liquidation. It is 
the same line of reasoning as that followed 
in the Kimbell-Diamond Milling case and 
other cases dealing with acquisition of 
stock for the purpose of acquiring assets.
The basis of the liquidated subsidiary’s 
assets is, in effect, rewritten for equity 
capital purposes, to conform to the basis 
of the underlying stock and this rewritten 
basis continues to be used by the parent 
company after the liquidation for equity 
capital purposes. Depreciation, depletion, 
and amortization must be recomputed for 
all periods after the control date where­
ever necessary to conform to the rewritten 
basis of the assets, but the recomputed 
depreciation, etc. is used only for adjust­
ing invested capital. In the excess-profits- 
tax return it is the regular depreciation, 
etc., and not the recomputed amount, 
which is allowed as a deduction.
While section 470 relates to intercor­
porate liquidations affecting asset ap­
proach invested capital, it also may have a 
bearing on the excess-profits credit under 
the income method. If a cost basis inter­
corporate liquidation occurred during the 
last two years of the base period, the base 
period capital addition could be affected 
by it. If such a liquidation took place dur­
ing an excess-profits-tax year it could have 
an effect on the capital addition or capital 
reduction. This is because the assets as 
restated for purposes of the intercorporate 
liquidation would have to be taken into 
consideration.
In cases where the stock of the subsid­
iary is held by the parent company with 
a basis other than cost the rules regarding 
restatement of assets upon intercorporate 
liquidation do not apply.
A parent company which acquired some 
of the stock of the liquidated subsidiary 
by purchase and other stock on a non-cost 
basis must make computations to restate 
that portion of the subsidiary’s assets 
which is allocable to the cost basis stock. 
No adjustment would ordinarily be neces­
sary with respect to the portion of the as­
sets allocable to non-cost basis stock.
Section 472
Section 472 deals with the effect of 
intercorporate liquidations on historical 
invested capital.
In the case of cost basis stock, inter­
corporate liquidations under the historical 
method are, like those under the asset 
approach, based on the substitution of the 
parent company’s cost basis of the stock, 
for the subsidiary’s basis of its assets. 
However, there is an added feature of 
reflecting by plus or minus adjustment 
the increase or decrease in the subsidiary’s 
net worth between acquisition of 80% or 
more control by the parent company and 
liquidation of the subsidiary. This plus or 
minus adjustment is treated, for invested 
capital purposes, as a recognized gain or 
loss realized by the parent company on the 
day after the intercorporate liquidation. 
It is reflected in the parent company’s 
earnings and profits for the particular year 
and also in its accumulated earnings. In 
the case of a cost basis intercorporate 
liquidation, the Sansome rule does not 
apply.
Where there is an intercorporate liquida­
tion involving cost basis stock and it 
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occurs in an excess profits-tax year, it is 
advisable not to allow the liquidation to 
occur on the last day of the taxable year 
if a plus adjustment is involved, but to al­
low it to do so if a minus adjustment 
exists. For example, if a liquidation in­
volving a plus adjustment occurred on the 
last day of the taxable year, the plus 
adjustment would be considered a gain 
realized by the parent on the first day of 
the next taxable year and so presumably 
would not be includable in the parent 
company’s accumulated earnings at the 
beginning of that year and consequently 
would not be includable in the parent’s 
equity invested capital until the beginning 
of the following year. By liquidating the 
subsidiary the day before the end of the 
year any plus adjustment will be treated 
as a gain realized by the parent on the last 
day of the year and so will be includable 
in the parent company’s accumulated earn­
ings (and equity invested capital) at the 
beginning of the new year. Where the plus 
or minus adjustment is large this point 
can be important.
In computing the plus or minus adjust­
ment in an intercorporate liquidation, the 
transferee’s stock investment must not be 
reduced by losses (if any) availed of dur­
ing prior consolidated return periods. This 
rule applies whether the stock has a cost 
or a non-cost basis.
Where the subsidiary’s stock had a non­
cost basis, the subsidiary’s assets are not 
restated upon the intercorporate liquida­
tion as they are where cost basis stock is 
involved. However, any gain or loss on the 
intercorporate liquidation is treated as a 
plus or minus adjustment which is added 
to or deducted from the parent company’s 
equity invested capital. In this case the 
plus or minus adjustment is treated as a 
separate item and is not merged with the 
parent company’s earnings and profits. In 
addition, in the case of non-cost basis 
stock the Sansome rule must be given 
effect to. It could happen in a non-cost 
basis intercorporate liquidation that there 
would be a minus adjustment on the inter­
corporate liquidation and at the same time 
the parent company would have an addi­
tion to its earnings or a reduction of its 
deficit by application of the Sansome rule. 
In such a case the parent company would 
have to make a further adjustment in its 
invested capital under section 458(e) (3).
About the only case in which there can 
be an intercorporate liquidation where 
the parent company owns less than 80% 
of the stock of the subsidiary is in the case 
of a statutory merger or consolidation. If 
one corporation owns stock in another 
(whether or not more than 80%) and 
the two are merged or consolidated in a 
statutory merger or consolidation, the 
transfer of the property of the corporation 
whose stock was so held to the resulting 
corporation is treated as an intercorporate 
liquidation. The regulations, however, deny 
a cost basis to the resulting corporation 
unless, immediately after the merger or 
consolidation, the shareholders of the 
former parent corporation are in 80% or 
more control of the resulting corporation.
The basis of stock of a subsidiary for 
the purpose of intercorporate liquidation 
computations is not always the same in 
amount as it is for ordinary income-tax 
purposes. The regulations state that it is 
to be the basis for determining loss upon 
a sale or exchange, adjusted by amounts 
proper under section 115(1) for determin­
ing earnings and profits. The implication 
of the reference to adjustments under 
section 115(1) is that section 472 requires 
a new determination of the source of pre­
liquidation distributions by the transferor. 
For example, distributions which under 
section 113(b) are to applied in reduction 
of the stock basis, because made from 
March 1, 1913 appreciation realized, would 
not be so applied under this rule.
Anyone determining the excess-profits- 
tax effects of an intercorporate liquidation 
should be familiar with the following four 
special adjustments: pre-control adjust­
ment, post-control adjustment, transferee 
adjustment to earnings, and post-liquida­
tion adjustment. These adjustments are 
technical, but they should be understood 
as they can have a bearing on the invested 
capital of the parent company after the 
intercorporate liquidation of a subsidiary.
I believe the Treasury recognizes that 
to apply the provisions of Part III literally 
and completely, would in many cases be 
impracticable and impossible.
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What are the purposes of Sections 463 and 464? What happens when an existing 
corporation acquires all or part of the component assets of another corpora­
tion? How must one treat differences in base periods when there is a transfer 
between two corporations? How well does the law cover such a situation?
WALLACE M. JENSEN
When a corporation computes its excess­
profits credit under the income method it 
is permitted to include as a part of its 
credit 12% of the hase period capital 
addition and must take into account 12% 
of its net capital addition or reduction 
since the base period. If a Part II trans­
action occurs during the last two years 
of the base period or at any time there­
after, and if the average base period net 
income is determined under Part II, then 
the base period capital addition and the 
net capital changes to be taken into 
account must be determined under the 
rules provided in sections 463 and 464.
The rules provided in these sections and 
in the proposed Part II regulations, which 
were released on August 16, 1951, are 
quite complicated but can be segregated 
into certain basic provisions as follows:
1. Whether the transaction occurred 
during the base period or subsequent to 
the base period.
2. Whether the acquiring corporation 
acquired all of the assets or only part of 
the assets of the component.
3. Whether any part of the stock of a 
component was purchased for cash or 
other assets at or prior to the time that 
the assets of the component are acquired 
in a Part II transaction.
Rather than deal with the rules in the 
order in which they are presented in the 
Regulations, I believe that a clearer pic­
ture can be obtained if the rules are con­
sidered as they relate to three specific 
types of Part II transactions. These trans­
actions will be discussed in the following 
order:
1. The typical situation where an exist­
ing corporation acquires all of the assets 
of another corporation.
2. The splitting up of an existing cor­
poration into two corporations, involving 
the transfer of assets to at least one newly 
formed corporation.
3. The less frequent situation where an 
existing corporation acquires only part of 
the assets of another existing corporation 
in a Part II transaction.
When the Part II transaction occurs 
during an excess-profits-tax year of the 
acquiring corporation the base period capi­
tal addition of the component is added to 
that of the acquiring corporation so that 
the resulting base period capital addition 
is the sum of the two separately deter­
mined amounts. For the year of the trans­
action, however, only a portion of the 
base period capital addition of the com­
ponent is taken into account, measured by 
the ratio of the remaining days in the 
year after the transaction to the total num­
ber of days in the year.
If the transaction occurred during the 
two years preceding the first excess-profits- 
tax year, the base period capital addition 
of the acquiring corporation is computed 
by combining the yearly base period capi­
tal of both the acquiring corporation and 
the component. For instance, if the trans­
action occurred during the first taxable 
year preceding the first excess-profits-tax 
year of the acquiring corporation, then the 
yearly base period capital of the compon­
ent for both the first and second preceding 
years are added to the corresponding items 
of the acquiring corporation. Where the 
transaction took place in the acquiring cor­
poration’s second preceding taxable year, 
only the yearly base period capital of the 
component for its second preceding year 
is taken into account.
The Regulations (Sec. 40.464-1 (b) (4) ) 
provide that, if the transaction occurred 
prior to July 1, 1950, it is then necessary 
to determine constructive taxable years 
ending after the transaction; that is, the 
component is deemed to have as many 
taxable years as are necessary for it to 
have a first excess-profits-tax year so that 
what would have been its first excess-pro­
fits-tax year and two immediately preced­
ing years can be identified. Wherever it 
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is necessary to determine a yearly base 
period capital for any constructive date 
after the Part II transaction, the amount 
is to be determined as of the day of the 
transaction.
Perhaps an example will better illustrate 
how these rules are applied. We are deal­
ing with the situation where an existing 
corporation acquires all of the assets of a 
component, and let us assume that both 
corporations were in existence during the 
entire last half of the base period and are 
on a calendar year basis. Then, if the 
transaction occurs after January 1, 1950, 
the separate base period capital additions 
of each corporation are combined. If the 
transaction occurred in 1949, then we com­
bine the separate yearly base period capi­
tal as of January 1, 1948, and as of 
January 1, 1949. If the transaction occur­
red in 1948, we combine only the separate 
yearly base period capital as of January 1, 
1948.
But suppose these two corporations had 
different taxable years. Assume that Cor­
poration A is the acquiring corporation 
and is on the calendar year basis but that 
Corporation B, the component, had a fis­
cal year ended June 30; then the result 
would depend upon the time of the trans­
action. The several possibilities would be:
Assume that the Part II transaction oc­
curs after July 1, 1950, i.e., after the 
beginning of the first excess-profits-tax 
year of both corporations. Then the sep­
arate base period capital additions of the 
acquiring corporation and of the compo­
nent are combined to obtain the base 
period capital addition of the acquiring 
corporation for any taxable year there­
after.
Assume that the Part II transaction oc­
curs on April 1, 1950, i.e., after the begin­
ning of the first excess-profits-tax year 
of the acquiring corporation but during 
the first taxable year of the component 
corporation immediately preceding the first 
excess-profits-tax year which the compo­
nent is deemed to have. Then the base 
period capital addition to be combined 
would be separately determined using the 
following dates:
Corporation A: 1/1/48,1/1/49, and 1/1/50 
Corporation B: 7/1/48, 7/1/49, and 4/1/50
Assume that the Part II transaction oc­
curs on April 1, 1949, i.e., during the first 
preceding taxable year of the acquiring 
corporation and during the second preced­
ing taxable year of the component. Then 
the separate yearly base period capital 
would be combined as follows: 
Corporation A: 1/1/48, 1/1/49, and 1/1/50 
Corporation B: 7/1/48, 7/1/49 -----------
The component may have been a sub­
sidiary or an affiliated corporation and, 
therefore, the Regulations (Sec. 40.464- 
1(c)(1)) provide rules for excluding in­
tercompany transactions. Although there 
appears to be no specific statutory pro­
vision in section 464, comparable to sec­
tion 463(a) (7) which leaves the rules for 
intercorporate transactions to be deter­
mined by regulations, the need for them 
is evident. The Regulations provide that, 
in computing the yearly base period capi­
tal of either corporation, the intercompany 
stock holdings are to be excluded from 
equity capital and inadmissible assets. 
Likewise, daily borrowed capital, the re­
lated interest adjustment, and the loans 
to members of a controlled group are de­
termined as if the indebtedness between 
the two corporations did not constitute 
borrowed capital.
The intent of the Regulations seems to 
be that the acquiring corporation and the 
component are treated as a unit and that 
all intercorporate transactions are to be 
disregarded as would be the case if con­
solidated financial statements were pre­
pared. However, where the two corpora­
tions had different taxable years and as a 
result the yearly base period capital of 
each is determined as of a different date, 
then the amounts to be excluded from 
each corporation may not be identical. 
Just what the result might be in any given 
case would depend upon the facts, but it 
would seem that the rules may have to 
be mixed with a little common sense in 
their application to obtain an equitable 
result.
Where the transaction occurs after the 
base period and the general rule is that 
the separately determined base period 
capital additions of each corporation are 
then combined, the Regulations are not 
clear as to whether such amounts should 
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be redetermined on the basis of eliminat­
ing intercorporate transactions. It is my 
thought that it should be done. Take, for 
instance, a situation where all of the bor­
rowed capital of a subsidiary consisted of 
loans from its parent corporation. In that 
case the base period capital addition of 
the subsidiary has been penalized by an 
interest adjustment on borrowed capital 
but no corresponding offsetting interest 
adjustment has been permitted to the par­
ent even though its yearly base period 
capital has been reduced because of the 
loan to a member of a controlled group. 
Unless the yearly base period capital of 
each corporation is redetermined it would 
seem that the intercompany transactions 
would not be eliminated entirely from all 
of the factors affecting the income credit.
It should be pointed out that the intent 
of the statute and of the Regulations 
seems to be that the base period capital 
addition of the acquiring corporation is 
computed by combining the separate base­
period capital additions in some instances 
and by combining the separately deter­
mined yearly base-period capital in other 
instances. The exact method followed de­
pends upon whether the Part II transac­
tion occurs before or after the end of the 
base period. There is no provision for 
combining the equity capital of each cor­
poration, the borrowed capital of each, 
etc. Each of these factors is taken into 
account in its appropriate place, and only 
the computed base period capital addition 
or yearly base period capital is combined.
Thus, where the Part II transaction oc­
curs during an excess-profits-tax year and 
the separate base period capital additions 
are combined, the fact that one of the 
corporations had a zero base period capi­
tal addition (because its yearly base pe­
riod capital decreased rather than in­
creased) would not operate to reduce the 
base period capital addition of the other 
corporation. The result is the sum of the 
two, separately computed. But, where the 
transaction occurred during the base pe­
riod and the separately computed yearly 
base period capital is combined, a decrease 
in the case of one corporation would off­
set an increase in the yearly base period 
capital of the other.
So far I have dealt only with the base 
period capital addition in the situation 
where one corporation acquires all of the 
assets of another. Turning now to the net 
capital changes subsequent to the base 
period, section 463 applies only when the 
Part II transaction occurs in an excess- 
profits-tax year and only when the aver­
age base period net income is being com­
puted under Part II.
The proposed regulations dealing with 
this point are also quite complicated but 
may be broken down into two situations; 
namely, whether the transaction occurred 
before or after June 30, 1950. If the trans­
action occurred after June 30, 1950, then 
any property paid in during the year for 
stock of the component or distributions 
made during the year which were not out 
of earnings and profits are taken into ac­
count by the acquiring corporation begin­
ning with the day after the transaction. 
Also, where the transaction occurs after 
June 30, 1950, the difference between the 
equity capital of the component at the be­
ginning of that year as compared with the 
beginning of its first excess-profits-tax 
year is taken into account in computing 
the acquiring corporation’s daily capital 
addition or reduction beginning with the 
day of the transaction. This rule applies 
only for the year of the transaction, and 
for subsequent years the equity capital of 
the component as of the beginning of its 
first excess-profits-tax year is combined 
with that of the acquiring corporation as 
of the beginning of its first excess-profits- 
tax year.
Likewise, the daily borrowed capital of 
the component as of the beginning of its 
first excess-profits-tax year and the origi­
nal inadmissible assets are added to the 
corresponding amounts of the acquiring 
corporation. In the year of the transaction 
the same amounts are added to the daily 
borrowed capital and daily inadmissible 
assets of the acquiring corporation for 
each day preceding the transaction so that 
as a result it has a zero effect for the part 
of the year prior to the transaction, and 
any subsequent changes are reflected for 
the remainder of the year. Loans to mem­
bers of a controlled group and inadmis­
sible assets representing stock of members 
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of a controlled group are similarly han­
dled.
If the transaction occurred after the 
beginning of the first excess-profits-tax 
year of the acquiring corporation but prior 
to July 1, 1950, then all computations 
which are ordinarily made as of the be­
ginning of the first excess-profits-tax year 
of the component are made as of the time 
immediately prior to the transaction. For 
instance, if both of the corporations were 
on a calendar year basis and the transac­
tion occurred April 1, 1950, the base peri­
od capital addition would have been 
determined for each corporation to and 
including January 1, 1950. But for the 
purpose of determining the net capital 
changes subsequent to the base period, the 
transaction date of April 1, 1950, is used 
in lieu of January 1, 1950, for all com­
putations necessary to determine the re­
spective items of the component to be 
added to those of the acquiring corpora­
tion as of January 1, 1950. The Regula­
tions distinguish between transactions 
which occurred before or after June 30, 
1950. It is at variance with the theory of 
constructive taxable years which the com­
ponent is deemed to have under Section 
40.464-1 (b) (4) relating to base period 
capital addition. For instance, January 1, 
1950, is used as the end of the base period 
for the purpose of computing the base 
period capital addition of such a compo­
nent but April 1, 1950, would be used to 
measure the equity capital and borrowed 
capital of the component to be added to 
the respective original amounts of the ac­
quiring corporation determined as of Jan­
uary 1, 1950. To the extent that such items 
of the component changed between Jan­
uary 1, 1950, and April 1, 1950, the re­
sult would be inequitable.
The Regulations also provide for the 
elimination of intercompany transactions 
in determining the net capital changes 
since the base period. In order to accom­
plish that purpose intercorporate stock 
holdings and intercompany loans are ex­
cluded as of the same dates as of which the 
original inadmissible assets and original 
equity capital are determined, and again 
the date depends upon whether the trans­
action was before or after June 30, 1950.
The Regulations under section 463 and 
464 supply rules to apply the limitations 
under section 462(j) (1) relating to the 
elimination of a possible duplication in 
transferred capital additions in cases 
where after December 31, 1945, the ac­
quiring corporation purchased stock of a 
corporation in whole or in part for cash 
or other assets and that corporation sub­
sequently becomes a component. The ef­
fect of the rules is to eliminate the ap­
propriate portion of the base period capital 
addition and the net capital changes prior 
to the purchase of the stock. For instance, 
if the acquiring corporation had purchased 
30% of the stock of the component on 
April 1, 1949, then 30% of the yearly base 
period capital of the component as of 
January 1, 1948, and January 1, 1949, 
would be eliminated. If the purchase 
had occurred on April 1, 1950, then 30% 
of the entire base period capital addi­
tion would be eliminated and also 30% 
of the original equity capital, original 
inadmissible assets, and the other factors 
necessary to determine the starting point 
for computing the net capital addition 
would not be taken into account.
No adjustment is necessary under sec­
tion 462(j) (1) except to the extent dup­
lication of experience occurs. Section 40.- 
462-10 of the proposed Regulations recog­
nizes that no duplication of base period 
experience may have occurred where the 
stock of the component is acquired through 
the use of money obtained through a bona 
fide increase in the capital structure 
(whether equity or borrowed) for the pur­
pose of acquisition. The Regulations un­
der sections 463 and 464 follow through 
in such a situation and provide for the 
exclusion from the base period capital 
addition or the net capital changes of 
such amount as is necessary to prevent 
the acquiring corporation having not only 
the benefit of the base period experience 
but also a possible duplication as a result 
of increased capital. These provisions in 
the Regulations are in very general terms 
and are not too clear. For instance, it is 
provided (Section 40.464-1(c) (2) ) that 
there shall be excluded from the base 
period capital addition of the acquiring 
corporation so much thereof as is attribu­
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table to assets obtained for the purpose of 
acquiring the stock in the component in 
such a transaction. If the purchase oc­
curred during the base period, it would 
appear that the yearly base period capital 
for any date after the purchase would 
have to be recomputed to eliminate the 
increased capital structure by which the 
funds were provided. In addition, the 
Regulations provide that in the case of 
determining the net capital changes so 
much of the increase in equity capital and 
of the increase in borrowed capital as is 
attributable to assets obtained for the pur­
pose of acquiring the stock shall be ex­
cluded.
It would have been helpful if the Regu­
lations had provided specific examples to 
illustrate how this general rule should be 
applied. For instance, suppose that some 
of the stock of a component had been 
purchased from its stockholders for 
$100,000 in cash, all of which was ob­
tained by a new bank loan. Such loan 
would have been included in the 
amount of $75,000 as borrowed capital 
in computing the base period capital addi­
tion or the net capital changes of the ac­
quiring corporation, less an appropriate 
interest adjustment, but how much is at­
tributable to the assets obtained for the 
purpose of acquiring the stock; that is, 
what amount must be eliminated? Is it the 
entire cost of $100,000? Is it the $75,000 
which was included in borrowed capital? 
Or is it 75% of the unpaid balance of the 
note payable on the dates that the neces­
sary computations are made? Also, is a 
portion of the interest adjustment excluded 
as well? It is my own opinion that it might 
be logical to require the elimination of 
whatever amount may have been includ­
able in either equity or borrowed capital 
as the source of the funds at the moment 
of the purchase and that the same amount 
might justifiably be required to be elimi­
nated in all subsequent computations. Such 
a rule, however, might work inequities 
where the financing was arranged on a 
temporary rather than a permanent basis, 
and perhaps it is just as well that the 
Regulations deal with this point only in a 
general way. The fact remains that the 
computation to be made is vague and un­
certain and subject to controversy.
The general situation in section 461(a) 
(1) (E), where only part of the assets of 
the component are transferred to an ac­
quiring corporation, would be the case 
where an existing corporation is split up 
into two corporations, a subsidiary corpor­
ation is created, or the assets of a part­
nership are transferred in part to a 
corporation. In most cases the acquiring 
corporation will be a new corporation 
created incident to the transaction.
In such a situation, if the transaction 
occurs after the beginning of the first ex­
cess-profits-tax year of the component, 
then the acquiring corporation takes over 
that portion of the base period capital ad­
dition of the component measured by the 
ratio of the fair-market value of the assets 
transferred to the fair-market value of all 
assets of the component immediately prior 
to the transaction.
Since the transaction may have occurred 
during the first excess-profits-tax year of 
one corporation and during the preceding 
taxable year of the other corporation, 
special rules are necessary. Where the 
transaction occurs during a preceding year 
of the component, then the yearly base 
period capital of the acquiring corporation 
for the year of the transaction is com­
puted as of the day following the trans­
action, which thereby would include 
the assets transferred. If, however, the 
transaction occurs in the first excess- 
profits-tax year of the acquiring cor­
poration and in a preceding year of the 
component, then the yearly base period 
capital addition of the acquiring corpora­
tion for its first preceding year would be 
the portion of the yearly base period capi­
tal of the component for the first day of 
its year in which the transaction occurred. 
Here again the portion is determined by 
the ratio of the fair-market value of the 
assets transferred. While these rules are 
quite complicated, a simple example might 
help to clarify them. If the component cor­
poration had a fiscal year ended June 30 
and transferred some of its assets to a 
newly formed corporation on April 1, 1950, 
and the acquiring corporation adopted the 
calendar year basis, then July 1, 1948, 
July 1, 1949, and April 1, 1950, would be 
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the dates to be used in computing the 
yearly base-period capital transferred to 
the acquiring corporation.
While the portion of the base period 
capital addition or the yearly base period 
capital transferred to the acquiring corpor­
ation in an “E” transaction is measured by 
the ratio of fair-market value of assets, the 
same yardstick is not used for the purpose 
of determining the transferred net capital 
addition. In such a case, section 463 ap­
plies where the transaction occurred in 
an excess-profits-tax-year and it becomes 
necessary to determine for the acquiring 
corporation the original equity capital, 
original borrowed capital, and original in­
admissible assets as of the beginning of its 
first excess-profits-tax-year. In this situa­
tion the equity capital of the component 
as of the beginning of its first excess-pro­
fits-tax year is allocated to the acquiring 
corporation in the proportion that the 
equity capital transferred bears to the 
equity capital of the component immed­
iately prior to the transaction. Likewise, 
the borrowed capital of the component at 
the beginning of its first excess-profits-tax 
year is allocated in the ratio that the bor­
rowed capital transferred is to the total 
borowed capital of the component immed­
iately prior to the transaction. In the same 
manner the original inadmissible assets of 
the component are allocated in the pro­
portion that the inadmissible assets trans­
ferred to the acquiring corporation bear to 
the total inadmissible assets of the com­
ponent immediately prior to the transac­
tion. This may result in some unrealistic 
allocations. For instance, equity capital is 
measured by the adjusted basis of the as­
sets transferred, which may be substantial­
ly more or less than their fair-market 
value. In many cases it may well result 
that the ratios of equity capital and bor­
rowed capital transferred are not in line 
with the fair-market value ratio used in 
allocating average base-period net income 
and the base-period capital addition.
In most cases where a component trans­
fers only a part of its assets to an ac­
quiring corporation, the acquiring corpor­
ation will be a new corporation created 
incident to the transaction. In those unus­
ual circumstances where the acquiring 
corporation had been in existence prior to 
the “E” transaction, however the statute 
left the rules to be prescribed by the 
Regulations.
The Regulations (Section 40.461-7 (b)), 
provide that in such a case the component 
will be deemed to have transferred a part 
of its assets to an imaginary corporation 
and that such an imaginary corporation 
then transferred all of its assets to the 
acquiring corporation. In that way the 
general rules of an “E” transaction apply 
to the first assumed transfer to the imagi­
nary corporation, and the general rules 
relating to the transfer of all assets apply 
to the second assumed transfer.
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